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Executive Summary 
Interpersonal trust - a willingness to accept vulnerability or risk based 
on expectations regarding another person’s behavior – is a vitally 
important concept for human behavior, affecting our interactions both 
with adversaries and competitors as well as with allies and friends.  
Indeed, interpersonal trust could be said to be responsible in part for 
nudging competitors towards becoming allies, or – if betrayed – leading 
friends to become adversaries. 
 
This document summarizes the state of the art (and science) in 
interpersonal trust research, describing how researchers define trust 
and its components, exploring a range of theories about how people 
decide whether to trust, and describing how trust may work differently 
for some people than for others. This primer will not critique all existing 
studies and their methods.  It is written as a relatively non-technical 
overview for individuals whose personal success depends on the 
development of trust and for researchers seeking to better understand 
how trust has been studied and operationalized, to date. 
 
 
 
• Understanding trust is essential for improving performance of 
individuals and their organizations, as well as honing their 
competitive advantage by knowing whom outside the organization 
to trust. Much of the trust research to date, however, has not 
employed experimental conditions or measures that approximate 
those appropriate for real world conditions where an inadequate 
gauge of trust has meaningful, and often severe, consequences. 
 
• While a common assumption, the research suggests that deception 
and trust are not simply opposing concepts, but rather might coexist 
in certain situations.  
 
• Over the past 50 years, trust researchers have identified some of 
the main determinants of trust and the key behaviors it predicts, but 
have not focused on the biopsychosocial mechanisms of human 
trust. Combining these traditional approaches with those of social 
neuroscience researchers, who study the neural underpinnings of 
social behaviors, holds great promise.  
 
  
• Interpersonal trust has been defined in a variety of ways by different 
researchers. Most researchers agree that trust is driven mainly by a 
combination of cognitive (thinking) and affective (emotional) factors.  
 
• Theories vary as to whether trust starts from a positive, negative, or 
neutral baseline, and the difference is likely to depend on context.  
There are also different models that represent trust and distrust as 
separate constructs or as opposing ends of the same spectrum. The 
starting point for trust and/or distrust may depend upon characteristics 
of the person, the situation, and prior information about the potential 
trustee. 
 
• In a decision to trust, the trustor typically assesses the other’s 
trustworthiness. The “Big Three” predictors in trustworthiness research 
are ability (perceptions of a trustee’s competence and consistency), 
benevolence (perceptions of the trustee’s caring, goodwill, empathy, 
and commitment to shared goals), and integrity (perceptions of the 
trustee’s objectivity, fairness, honesty, and dedication).   
 
• Different techniques have been used to measure trust, including 
survey-style assessments and behavioral games (e.g., the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Game and the Trust Game). In social dilemma games, 
however, it is often difficult to discern whether behavior represents the 
effects of trust specifically or of some more general process like 
“cooperation” or “collaboration.”   
 
• Humans have a limited capacity to process large amounts of 
complex social information, so they often unconsciously use mental 
shortcuts (heuristics) to simplify the process. These shortcuts, 
however, can lead to systematic biases and errors in generalized 
decision-making, and specifically in assessments of trustworthiness 
and decisions to trust.  
• Two complementary neural systems may affect human trust decisions: 
an automatic system that works quickly but learns slowly, is pushed by 
emotions, and doesn’t do well handling unusual circumstances; and a 
controlled system that operates more slowly but learns more quickly, is 
more deliberative and shaped by formal reasoning, and adapts well to 
exceptional circumstances. These complementary processes enable 
us to understand thoughts and feelings from another’s perspective.  Far 
from being mutually exclusive, these systems likely interact with and 
influence each other in different ways under different conditions.  
  
 
• Several methods have helped to identify brain structures involved in 
developing trust and associated behaviors. Such approaches include 
studying patients with brain lesions, use of functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI), and electroencephalography (EEG). Key 
brain regions identified in this research include the striatum, amygdala, 
prefrontal cortices, and anterior cingulate cortex. 
• A variety of neurochemicals in the brain – such as oxytocin, 
vasopressin, and dopamine- are involved in trust decisions. In 
particular, oxytocin, a neuropeptide hormone, has received a great deal 
of attention based on studies showing that it facilitates social 
engagement and increases a person’s willingness to be vulnerable 
within a social interaction. Interestingly, however, this willingness to be 
socially vulnerable does not appear to be related to more general risk-
taking behavior.  
• The behavioral norms and nature of the relationship between 
individuals and groups matter when attempting to understand and 
evaluate people’s behaviors in social interactions. Some social 
exchanges are based on communal norms, motivated by a caring, 
emotional bond and a desire to help, while other exchanges are driven 
just by market norms of getting what you pay for.  
• Group membership and relational status affect trust decisions. We are 
more likely to trust others whom we identify as being part of our “in-
group” or with whom we share a close social relationship, even when 
their actual behavior and individual characteristics may not merit such 
trust. 
• Individual differences substantially affect trust relationships.  The 
propensity to trust varies from person to person and from condition 
to condition, and is influenced by a variety of factors, including past 
experience, genetic predisposition, and personality characteristics, 
all of which may shape an individual’s interpretation of who and 
what can be trusted in a given context. 
• Cultural norms and differences can affect trust appraisals and 
decisions. Cultural influences may also shape how we perceive and 
encode social information. How, and the extent to which culture 
influences these processes, however, has only recently been rigorously 
studied.   
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Introduction 
Trust, defined in this primer as a willingness to accept vulnerability 
or risk based on confident expectations regarding another person’s 
behavior, is important to many human interactions, particularly in 
contexts of  limited information or high consequences for a betrayal 
of  trust. Despite trust's importance and a long history of  research 
on trust in specific environments, it has not been successfully 
operationalized for many broader contexts in which human trust 
plays a significant, if  often underappreciated, role. This primer 
provides an overview of  research, primarily from social psychology, 
economics, and neuroscience, aimed at helping to operationalize 
trust by identifying its psychological, behavioral, neural, and 
physiological signals and mechanisms. 
 
 
1. Truthfulness and trustworthiness are not synonymous, nor are 
deception and untrustworthiness merely different endpoints of a single 
continuum.  Indeed, trust and deception might coexist in certain 
situations, particularly in contexts where deception is either common 
place or necessary, yet trust is still vital. 
2. While researchers have worked to define trust from a cognitive and 
physiological perspective, that research has often not translated into 
ecological-validity for real world behaviors and contexts. 
3. In order to use trust research effectively, it will be necessary to 
integrate insights about human cognition from social psychology, 
information about decision making drawn from behavioral economics, 
and data on emotion and brain functioning from neuroscience into a 
model that allows us to better understand, monitor, and predict trust in 
contexts where human motivations, behaviors, and the environment 
itself, may be complex and dynamic. 
Section 
1 
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Purpose of the Primer 
 
nterpersonal trust is quite possibly the most pivotal, least well-defined, and 
least directly measured concept 
affecting individuals and 
organizations that must 
successfully maneuver complex and 
dynamic human-centric environments.  
Though definitions of trust, as 
discussed later, are varied and often 
complicated, trust is fundamentally a 
willingness to accept vulnerability or 
risk based on expectations regarding 
another person’s behavior.  As a 
practical matter then, trust is 
expressed through a decision.  We 
decide - sometimes intuitively, 
sometimes after conscious deliberation 
–whether to trust.  Such decisions are 
important when individuals and groups are interacting with adversaries and 
competitors and equally vital when fostering optimal team performance (see 
Appendix C). 
 
Trust in Complex Environments 
 
The issue of interpersonal trust is complex when individuals or organizations are 
trying to achieve goals that are dependent on cooperative or uncooperative 
competitors. To meet these goals often requires maneuvering a frequently 
shifting landscape of individual, organizational, behavioral, economic, political, 
social, and cultural factors that influence both the competitor and the individual 
or organization trying to develop trust. When these goal-directed professionals 
must operate within such an environment, cooperation with competitors is 
sometimes necessary, yet simultaneous motivation may exist to deceive and gain 
a competitive advantage. In order for each party to accomplish their goals, they 
may have to engage in cooperative behaviors, which – in spite of deception – may 
require an assessment of another’s trustworthiness. Many professionals that rely 
on personal relationships to accomplish their goals often seek to cultivate trust 
and they must likewise decide whom to trust, for what purposes, under what 
conditions, with which resources, and for how long.   
 A previously unknown person may walk into a competitor company – or 
perhaps just send an electronic message - claiming to have valuable 
I        DEFINING TRUST AND 
          TRUSTWORTHINESS 
Trust is defined here as a willingness to 
accept vulnerability or risk based on 
expectations regarding another person’s 
behavior.  A variety of specific trust 
definitions used by different trust 
researchers can be found in Section 2.  
Trustworthiness, on the other hand, 
refers to the characteristics of, and 
conditions around, the person or thing 
being trusted, and which facilitate that 
trust.   
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information about another company’s capabilities, products, and marketing 
strategy.   
 A suspected criminal, who has been brought in for questioning, may have 
refused to cooperate at all for several hours, but finally, during an interview, 
freely reveals seemingly critical information of interest. 
 A rescue operation might be planned to recover personnel believed to be 
trapped in a remote or hard to access area.  Analysts have identified the 
location with a high degree of confidence, but just before the operation is to be 
launched, a longstanding resource from that area comes forward to say the 
location is incorrect. 
 Under tight deadlines or facing critical decisions with limited information, 
organizational leadership and support staff – despite differences in their 
work skills and products – must be able to trust each other for an 
organization to function optimally and achieve its ends.   
 A team working collectively on a project must have confidence in their 
colleagues’ competence and shared commitment to the team’s success, 
especially if the team is working in a geographically distributed manner.   
 When an organization’s personnel are given directives without an underlying 
explanation, some research suggests that they may react differently if the 
person delivering the instructions is someone they trust or someone they 
distrust.   
As we can see, trust matters not only for interactions between different groups 
and organizations, but also for the internal interactions among personnel within 
a group, since some emerging research suggests that groups in certain 
environments require a degree of trust among their members in order to 
outcompete their rivals or to get their jobs done in austere and challenging 
environments.   
 
How Might Trust Research Be Operationalized? 
 
Interpersonal trust research could lead to some important advances in 
understanding – and optimizing - how organizations navigate complex, 
dynamic and often highly stressful environments.  As evidenced by quite a bit 
of the organizational behavior trust research, measures of trust used in these 
studies, might easily transfer to such organizations, work teams and 
leadership. Operationally, however, much of the trust research has not been 
based on trust-related tasks or behaviors that approximate those encountered 
in the real world.  Likewise, most of the measurements and signals of trust 
used in these studies thus far would be difficult to apply in “the field.”    
T H E  S C I E N C E  O F  I N T E R P E R S O N A L  T R U S T  
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For the most part, traditional research approaches to trust have tended to 
adopt a purely rational economic view, which assumes that people will adjust 
their own thresholds of vulnerability and confidence in others in ways that will 
maximize their own rewards and positive outcomes and minimize negative 
ones.  But there are an increasing number of empirical examples where 
people’s decisions and behavior are at variance with objective and “rational” 
calculations of expected value. 
Additionally, emotions also affect decision making and can override an 
objective calculus, sometimes disrupting otherwise good decisions, but at 
other times improving decision-making.  Consequently, a recent trend in the 
field of behavioral economics is not to view human behavior (including trust) as 
either rational or irrational, but rather as social.  A social orientation to trust 
presents a different set of rewards and punishments than a classical economic 
model. But how would this social orientation affect how people forecast or 
predict others’ behavior?    What is the basis for a confident appraisal, and can 
it be modified by experience?  These are the kinds of questions that, since the 
1990s, have been the focus of social cognitive neuroscience.   
While much of the “deep” research on defining trust has 
come from marketing, organizational behavior, strategic 
management, and industrial/organizational psychology, 
recent advances in understanding mechanisms of trust 
have emerged from the relatively new discipline of social 
neuroscience.  Social neuroscience 
seeks to understand the neurobiological 
underpinnings of social behavior (Decety 
& Keenan, 2006).  It emerged during the 
boom of “neuro-disciplines” such as 
neuroeconomics, neuromarketing, 
neuroethics and neuroanthropology 
(Choudhury, Nagel, & Slaby, 2009; 
Vidal, 2009) – all exploring neural 
correlates of different human behaviors, 
fueled in part by significant advances in 
neuroimaging technology, such as fMRI 
(see page 34 for more discussion of 
these new technologies).   
Social neuroscience examines the kinds 
of processes and questions that social 
psychologists have traditionally pursued, 
but using physiological measures and 
imaging tools from cognitive 
neuroscience (Crone, et al., 2009; 
Raichle, 2003; Van Overwalle, 2009).  
Its researchers are particularly interested in how humans understand and 
control (or regulate) themselves in social environments, how they understand 
Social 
Cognitive 
Neuroscience 
  WHAT IS SOCIAL 
COGNITIVE 
NEUROSCIENCE? 
 
Social cognitive neuroscience is a 
multidisciplinary field of study combining 
the expertise of neuroscientists with 
scientists from the disciplines of social 
and cognitive psychology, anthropology, 
and sociology to better understand the 
neurobiological underpinnings of social 
behavior. Social cognitive neuroscience 
examines behavior at three levels – the 
social level (social and emotional 
contexts and behaviors), the cognitive 
level (mechanisms for information 
processing) and the neural level (the 
brain and related neurophysiological 
bases of observed behavior). 
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others, and what happens in self-other interactions (Adolphs, 2003; 
Lieberman, 2007).    
Social neuroscientists have become increasingly interested in researching 
trust.  Much of their research to date, however, has little theoretical foundation 
or conceptual texture to the definition of trust.  Some consistent findings are 
emerging from their research, but the current nature of their research 
methodologies and conclusions means that it can be difficult to know if they 
are discerning signals of trust specifically, or some other general social 
cognitive process like empathy or cooperation.  
On the other hand, trust researchers in the fields of marketing, organizational 
behavior, strategic management, and industrial/organizational psychology 
have looked at trust for over 50 years as an applied social concept. While they 
have progressed in identifying psychological antecedents of trust (such as trust 
propensity, ability, benevolence, integrity) and the behaviors it predicts (such 
as risk-taking, task performance, citizenship behaviors, and counterproductive 
behaviors), they have not advanced very far in understanding the 
biopsychosocial mechanisms of human trust.   
What these researchers have done, however, is to interrogate and deconstruct 
the concept in a way that gives it texture; positing types and components of 
trust that could be very useful for conceptualizing more sophisticated research 
questions about how interpersonal trust is formed and changes. The potential 
synergy from combining the contributions of applied trust researchers and 
social neuroscientists seems to hold great promise for significantly advancing 
our understanding of, and methods for quantifying, different kinds of trust and 
trustworthiness among individuals and organizations that function in dynamic 
and complex environments.  
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Foundations of Trust 
Research  
 
Researchers have defined trust in a variety of  ways, but most 
definitions include a subject, an action or behavior, and an 
expectation of  future actions. While there is agreement at this 
broad level, details of  trust definitions vary substantially, 
particularly on questions about its unity or dimensionality, the 
baseline or starting point for trust, and the relationship between 
trust and distrust. This section discusses definitions of  trust, and 
how researchers measure different signals of  trust. 
 
 
 
1. Trust definitions are often based on indirect behavioral measures. In 
studying trust, researchers should clearly define their working definition 
of trust and describe how this definition relates to their selected 
measures. 
 
2. Theories vary as to whether trust starts from a positive, negative, or 
neutral baseline.  The starting point for trust and/or distrust may 
depend upon characteristics of an individual (the trustor), the situation, 
and prior information about the potential person or group to be trusted 
(the trustee). 
 
3. Polyvagal theory suggests a possible physiological explanation for 
shifts in baseline trust level. According to this theory, the vagus nerve 
may modify the body’s “fight or flight” response depending on whether 
an interpersonal encounter represents a threat or an opportunity for 
social engagement.   
 
Section 
2 
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4. Trust and distrust may not lie at opposite ends of a single spectrum. 
Rather, individuals may have complex trust relationships with others, in 
which they trust each other in some ways, but distrust in others. 
 
5. Most researchers agree that trust is driven mainly by a combination of 
cognitive (deliberative) and affective (emotional) factors. 
 
6. Different techniques have been used to measure trust, including 
survey-style assessments and behavioral games (e.g., the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Game and the Trust Game) as well as through neuroimaging 
technologies such as fMRI and EEG. 
 
 
 
 
eading biologists have grandly labeled trust and reciprocity as the “basis 
of all human systems of morality” (Nowak & Sigmund, 2000, p. 819).  
While this may be overstating the case, by any measure trust clearly 
plays important and often decisive roles in social interactions.  
Unsurprisingly for such a broad concept, then, trust has been defined, parsed, 
categorized and deconstructed in a 
variety of different ways by 
numerous scholars from a range of 
academic disciplines (for more on 
this, see Appendix A).   
 
Consequently, one of the few issues 
on which trust researchers seem to 
agree is that there is little specific 
agreement about how to define trust 
(e.g., Bigley & Pearce, 1998; 
Rousseau et al., 1998). Until the mid 
1990s, trust researchers rarely even 
addressed the definitional question 
in any depth (Castaldo, 2008). Since 
then, as McKnight and Chervany 
(2001-2002) point out, “There are 
literally dozens of definitions of trust. 
Some researchers find them 
contradictory and confusing, others 
conclude that the concept is almost 
(impossible) or elusive to define, 
and still others choose not to define 
it” (p. 37). Because trust is a broad concept, interacting with a variety of related 
behavioral concepts, it seems difficult - if not impossible - to define simply and 
precisely. 
 
Trust may be a single, unitary concept affected by different precursors (Mayer, 
Davis, and Schoorman, 1995).  Trust, alternatively, might be multidimensional, 
L 
THE CULTURE OF  
TRUST RESEARCH 
 
Trust researchers often debate and disagree 
with one another about the fine points of the 
structure of trust.  This diversity of viewpoints is 
common to many social science questions.  
Some may prefer the complexity of breaking 
down a concept into its smallest component 
parts, while others prefer to deal with the same 
concepts in a more unitary or parsimonious 
way. Fundamentally, however, most 
contemporary trust researchers are not that far 
apart in what they think is most important to 
understanding interpersonal trust.  They may 
use different terms or nuanced definitions, and 
make convincing arguments about the 
uniqueness of the particular concept they 
propose, but the core elements and processes 
involved are often quite similar. We focus here 
on these core concepts.  
T H E  S C I E N C E  O F  I N T E R P E R S O N A L  T R U S T  
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comprised of a variety of different facets (McAllister, 1995).  Or perhaps there 
are even distinctly different “types” of trust (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995).  Most 
trust researchers have not yet come to a consensus on the fine points of the 
structure of trust (Lewicki, Tomlinson, & Gillespie, 2006), though they do agree 
on some of the basics, which are laid out below.   
 
The ambiguity of fundamental concepts and definitions of trust poses a 
challenge not only to academic researchers but also to organizations and 
professionals that must make critical plans, decisions, and actions based, at 
least in part, on their own level of trust and on their perception of the 
trustworthiness of others.  There is a dearth, however, of robust scientific 
evidence about which elements or indicators of trust are most relevant to 
which context, how this may change due to a variety of human or 
environmental factors, or how best to measure them.  
 
How is Trust Defined? 
 
One recent meta-analysis (Castaldo, 2008) pulled together 72 different 
published definitions of trust from a variety of academic disciplines to examine 
what they had in common and how they differed.  Most of the definitions had 
elements that referred to (1) a subject, (2) an action/behavior, and (3) a future 
action (i.e. an intention) and/or expectation (i.e. a belief).  The future element, 
which involves predicting or anticipating another’s actions, is a distinctive and 
critical feature of trust. Deception, for example, is about something that has 
happened or is happening.  Trust, however, involves present decisions, often 
based on another person’s past behavior, that require anticipating some action 
that hasn’t yet happened. 
 
    WHAT IS A META-ANALYSIS? 
 
 
Meta-analysis is a statistical research technique that combines results from multiple studies 
and experiments.  In essence, each component study is treated like a participant in a larger 
experiment.  For an over-simplified example, suppose we were to use meta-analysis to 
examine whether increased blinking was associated with trustworthiness. We would first 
identify all known studies that looked at the blink-trustworthiness relationship. For each 
study, we would determine how big the “blink” difference was between those who proved 
trustworthy and those who did not.  This would be called an “effect size” – a standardized 
measure of the blink difference between the groups (trustworthy vs untrustworthy) that 
explains how helpful blinks are in discriminating one group from another.  Some studies 
might find no difference, others a small (0.2 to 0.3) difference, some may be medium (~0.5) 
and others might show a large effect (0.8 or greater).   Each of the effect sizes would be 
tallied together to estimate the overall size of the effect of trustworthiness on blinking. The 
advantage of a meta-analysis is that it provides larger number of participants (which makes 
for a more powerful study) and helps to minimize the impact of idiosyncrasies of any one 
experiment.  
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The following are a few illustrative examples of commonly used definitions of 
trust in the organizational behavior and management/marketing research 
literature: 
 
- “an individual may be said to have trust in the occurrence of an event if 
he expects its occurrence and his expectation leads to behavior which 
he perceives to have greater negative motivational consequences if the 
expectation is not confirmed than positive motivational consequences if 
it is confirmed” (Deutsch, 1958, p.266).  
- “accepted vulnerability to another’s possible but not expected ill will (or 
lack of good will) toward one” (Baier 1985, p.235).  
-  “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another 
party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular 
action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or 
control that other party” (Mayer et al., 1995, p.712). 
- “The extent to which a person is confident in, and willing to act on the 
basis of, the words, actions, and decisions of another” (McAllister, 
1995, p. 25). 
- “a state involving confident positive expectations about another’s 
motives with respect to oneself in situations entailing risk” (Lewicki & 
Bunker, 1995, p. 139, quoted from Boon & Holmes, 1991, p. 194).). 
- “expectations, assumptions or beliefs about the likelihood that 
another’s future actions will be beneficial, favorable or at least not 
detrimental” (Robinson, 1996, p.576).  
- “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability 
based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of 
another” (Rousseau et al. 1998, p.395).  
Common themes across these and dozens of other trust definitions suggest 
that interpersonal trust operates under conditions of acknowledged 
interdependence and is characterized by a willingness to accept vulnerability 
and risk based on confident expectations that another person’s future actions 
that will produce some positive result (Bigley & Pearce, 1998; Hosmer,1995; 
Kramer,1999; Mayer et al.,1995; Rousseau et al.,1998; Zand, 1972). 
 
Some researchers have questioned whether trust and distrust might even be 
distinct constructs.  One proponent of this distinction is Dr. Roy Lewicki, a 
social psychologist, who argues that, while trust and distrust may have 
cognitive affective/emotional and behavioral elements, the two concepts are 
different (Lewicki et al., 1998).  He regards trust as comprising the “confident 
positive expectations regarding another’s conduct,” with distrust relating to 
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“confident negative expectations regarding another’s conduct” (Lewicki et al., 
1998, p. 439).  Negative expectations might include a “lack of confidence in the 
other, a concern that the other may act so as to harm one, that he does not 
care about one’s welfare or intends to act harmfully, or is hostile” (Grovier 
1994, p. 240). 
 
Different researchers often prefer the nuances of their own particular terms or 
definitions, which sometimes means that two researchers are talking about the 
same basic concept, but using different names or words to describe them.  
Tellingly, nearly all of the proposed definitions are based on correlates from 
paper-and-pencil inventories and hypothesized associations of variables that 
are measured indirectly. The science is improving, but there is still a sense 
that, as in the proverb, researchers are often trying to define an elephant, while 
only being able to touch a particular part of it.  
 
How Does Trust Emerge? 
 
Traditionally, trust has been thought of as something that emerges in 
interpersonal relationships over time. Competing views suggest, however, that 
situations and individual differences often create a more positive or negative 
(non-neutral) starting point, which can affect the time it takes to develop, 
maintain, or rupture trust.  The traditional view of initial trust neutrality is called 
the “zero baseline” assumption (Blau, 1964; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985).   
The idea is that in routine situations of interpersonal trust, people “simply 
suspend(s) belief that the other is not trustworthy and behave(s) as if the other 
has similar values and can be trusted”(Jones & George,1998, p. 535).   
 
Some researchers contend that people often begin a situation of trust, not at 
zero baseline, but at a higher (positive trust) or lower (negative trust) level 
starting point due to a number of factors, including psychological and cultural 
variables..  Consequently, any individualized starting point is probably affected 
by a variety of factors (McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998), such as:   
 
• A trustor’s temperament, personality characteristics, and possibly even 
genotype may predispose her or him to be more trusting or suspicious 
of others generally.  In trust research, this is generally called “trust 
propensity” (Rotter, 1971, 1980).  Some studies have found that trust 
propensity varies across cultures (Fukuyama, 1995; Johnson & Cullen, 
2002).   
• A second set of factors comprising institution-based structures – such 
as regulation and oversight - may cause the trustor to feel more 
protected against harm or betrayal, just as their absence might 
increase a sense of vulnerability.  Other contextual and situational 
factors might also serve to increase a propensity towards suspicion or 
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trust.    
• Prior information about the trustee, such as knowledge of her or his 
reputation or past behavior, can influence initial baselines of trust.   
• Cognitive and perceptual shortcuts and cues – such as stereotypes, 
rapid judgments, or responses to facial features - may operate 
immediately for the trustor, even if they are entirely outside of his or her 
conscious awareness.  Such factors, while difficult to quantify, cannot 
be ignored, since a recent line of research shows that they can 
significantly affect who trusts whom, in what way, to what degree, and 
for how long.    
This baseline question is proving to be quite important for understanding 
mechanisms of interpersonal trust.  It prompts a fundamental need to 
distinguish whether we find others to be trustworthy (or not) because some 
positive emotion or belief is activated, or whether we make such judgments 
because some negative expectation or emotion, such as fear or anxiety, is 
inhibited.  Knowing how positive affect/belief is generated or negative 
affect/belief is inhibited in trust development– and how these functions interact 
with each other – adds a layer of complexity, but one that can be used to study 
the triggers and mechanisms by which trust emerges, is sustained, or lost.   
 
 
Dr. 
Stephen 
Porges, a 
Professor 
of Psychiatry at the 
University of Illinois, 
Chicago, offers one 
hypothesis about how 
human neurophysiological 
activation and deactivation 
might operate in our social 
interactions, potentially 
shaping trust baselines 
(Porges, 2001, 2003).   
Porges’ concept, which he 
calls Polyvagal Theory, 
focuses on the form and 
function of the vagus (10th 
cranial nerve), a key part of 
the autonomic nervous 
system (ANS), that is 
responsible for inhibiting 
responses such as how fast 
you breathe and how quickly 
your heart beats.  The theory 
Polyvagal 
Theory 
THE VAGUS NERVE 
 
 
The vagus nerve (also known as the 10th Cranial 
Nerve) originates at the base of the brain and extends 
downward into the chest and abdomen. It is the 
central nerve for carrying signals between the brain 
and visceral internal organs in the torso (i.e., the heart, 
respiratory system, and digestive system).  Perhaps 
counter intuitively, when stimulated, the vagus slows 
the heart rate and lowers blood pressure, which can 
help sponsor feelings of safety and allow for approach 
and social engagement. 
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proposes that the vagus has two distinct branches – which Porges calls the 
“vegetative vagus” and the “smart vagus” - each with distinct neuroanatomic 
locations and neurophysiological functions (Porges, 2001, 2003).     The 
vegetative vagus originating from the brain stem is believed to be 
phylogenetically older and primed for survival functions, such as freezing 
during threats.   The smart vagus is found only in mammals and appears to 
adjust our level of activation and visceral responses in order to facilitate social 
communication and behavior (Porges, 2001, 2003).    
 
These functions are an integral part of the human social engagement system 
and are similar, in many ways, to the approach-avoidance dynamic commonly 
discussed in the psychology of motivation (Elliot, 2006).  The basic premise is 
that when people are presented with a novel social stimulus (such as another 
person) the brain (and the ANS) first orients to it – “what is it?” -, then selects 
whether to activate its affiliative/engagement circuits (e.g., facial expression, 
vocalization and listening) or the sympathetic “fight or flight” response  – “is it 
dangerous?” (Porges, 2003).  Because survival is the organism's first priority, 
“fight or flight” might be seen as its default response.     
 
Sympathetic nervous system activation (SNS, “fight or flight”), however, can be 
counterproductive to social engagement.  Affiliative engagement requires 
attentional resources, so when affiliation is the goal, the smart vagus sends 
inhibitory messages to the SNS, which calms the heart and respiration and 
allows the person to focus.  When a threat is detected, however, and the 
immediate goal is to survive, the smart vagus withdraws, which allows the SNS 
to accelerate and prepare for “fight or flight” action (Porges, 2003, 2007).   
 
If it is true that without a change in vagal activation social encounters would 
automatically trigger a “fight or flight” response, then perhaps the usual trust 
baseline is somewhat “below zero”. Thus, individuals would vary in the degree 
to which they are inclined to be wary and innately exist in some state of 
increased vigilance or wariness.  And perhaps when we perceive a feeling of 
trust, we do so not because the other person has activated a positive emotion 
within us or inspired some discernible confidence in them, but rather because 
our natural alarm system is being disengaged.  If the warning signals are not 
rapidly firing, then perhaps that translates into a feeling of relative safety.  As 
of now, this theory remains speculative, of course, and does not resolve the 
zero baseline question or prove a particular mechanism of interpersonal trust, 
but it does at least propose one mechanism by which trust may emerge from a 
complex interplay between activation and inhibition of physiological systems.  
Components of Trust & Trustworthiness 
 
In a decision to trust, the trustor is typically assessing the 
trustworthiness of another person.  Trust and 
trustworthiness – many scholars argue (Mayer et al., 
1995) – are distinguishable concepts.  A common distinction presents trust as 
Trustworthiness  
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a person’s willingness to accept vulnerability to another conditioned on 
expectations regarding the other’s behavior.  Trustworthiness, on the other 
hand, comprises the characteristics of the thing or person being trusted 
(trustee) as those are framed by the environment in which trust must occur.  In 
this way, trustworthiness may be viewed as the key antecedents, drivers or 
determinants of trust rather than as synonymous with the behavior of trust 
itself. 
 
As a focus for research, dozens of studies have explored the potential 
determinants or antecedents of interpersonal trustworthiness.  Three 
determinants of trustworthiness that have stood the test of time, having been 
posited early by Aristotle and continuing through the writings of contemporary 
authors (e.g., Kasperson, 1986; Kasperson, Golding, and Tuler, 1992) are 
ability, benevolence, and integrity (Mayer et al., 1995; Peters, Covello, and 
MacCallum, 1997).    
 
Different researchers have used slightly different language to describe each of 
these concepts, but nearly all research has tended to incorporate ability, 
benevolence, and integrity.  Here are a few examples:  
 
• Peters, et al (1997) refer to the trustworthiness factors as (1) 
knowledge and expertise; (2) concern and care; and (3) openness and 
honesty.  
• McKnight and Chervany (2001-2002) analyzed 65 published definitions 
of trust and identified four broad categories of trust-related 
characteristics, which they labeled– (1) competence, (2) benevolence, 
(3) integrity (value laden), and (4) predictability (value-less).  
• Kasperson, et al., (1992) identified (1) commitment to a goal (and 
fulfilling fiduciary responsibilities; (2) competence; (3) caring; and (4) 
predictability as the four main components of trustworthiness.   
• Renn and Levhe (1991) identified five component trustworthy 
attributes:  (1) competence; (2) objectivity; (3) fairness; (4) consistency; 
and (5) faith (defined by the authors as goodwill).   
• Covello (1992) offered the following four: 1) caring and empathy; (2) 
dedication and commitment; (3) competence and expertise; and (4) 
honesty and openness. 
 
Each of these more contemporary concepts, however can be traced back to 
trustworthiness’ big three.    
 
• Ability, for example, is arguably based on a trustor’s perceptions of a 
trustee’s competence (Covello, 1992; Kasperson, et al., 1992) and 
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predictability (Kasperson, et al., 1992) or consistency (Renn & Levhe, 
1991).  
• Benevolence is based on perceptions and demonstrations of caring 
(Kasperson, et al., 1992), goodwill (Renn & Levine, 1991) and empathy 
(Covello, 1992), responsibly fulfilling obligations, and goal commitment. 
• Integrity is rooted in appraisals of a trustee’s objectivity, fairness (Renn 
& Levhe, 1991), and accurate/honest communication, each of which 
also supports a trustee’s perceived dedication or commitment to a goal 
(Covello, 1992; Kasperson, et al., 1992).   
Most contemporary researchers agree– whether they subscribe to a unitary or 
multidimensional view of trust - that trust has multiple drivers.  The trustee’s 
perceived ability, benevolence, and integrity (collectively, her or his 
“trustworthiness”) provide the key data for the decision.   
 
How do those data contribute to our understanding of trust?  At the broad 
level, researchers believe these factors operate through two complementary 
processes in trust-related decision making; cognitive processes (generally 
associated with deliberation, thoughts and beliefs) and affective processes 
(generally associated with feelings). This distinction resonates with popular 
conceptions of interpersonal trust, as we sometimes think someone can be 
trusted, we sometimes feel like we trust them, and sometimes we both think 
and feel that someone can be trusted.   
 
In practice, however, the distinctions among them are not so easily defined; 
the cognitive and emotional components are difficult to tease apart (Clark & 
Payne, 1997; Cummings & Bromiley, 1996; Van den Bos et al., 2008).  Some 
researchers think these components actually represent distinct types and/or 
stages– rather than the components – of interpersonal trust, though as of yet, 
no decisive empirical support exists for quantifying discrete types of trust 
(Schoorman et al., 2007).  Differing views exist about the potential roles and 
relative contributions of cognitive and affective factors and are a regular part of 
trust-related discussions and research (McAllister, 1995; Mayer et al., 1995).   
 
The cognitive component, which focuses on the role of 
beliefs, appraisals, expectations, attributions, and 
judgments in forming trust, has been more extensively 
studied than the affective component – owing in part to 
the disciplines of the researchers and in part to the ease 
of measurement. The cognitive component of trust is based on having 
sufficient knowledge of another person to forecast with varying degrees of 
certainty how he or she is likely to behave in a transaction, on a task, or in an 
environment.  It essentially comes from knowing the trustee “well enough” to 
feel confident that she or he will not betray the trust.  This component 
influences a shift in the baseline level of trust from a zero baseline to a more 
positive or negative expectation.   
Cognitive 
Component of 
Trust 
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A team leader, for example, might rely heavily on a new employee’s academic 
credentials and prior work performance to assess her ability and integrity, and 
determine what type of assignment to entrust to her.  McAllister (1995) would 
refer to this as cognition-based trust.  Shapiro et al. (1992) would call it 
knowledge-based trust.  Both draw on the cognitive drivers of trust decisions –
often as deliberative appraisals of a trustee’s ability and integrity - and are 
arguably very similar concepts. 
 
The affective/emotional component of detecting trust is 
more elusive, although potentially just as influential.  Most 
of the early studies simply focused on the absence of 
negative emotions, such as anger, in leading to trust.  
More recent studies on affective elements of trust have 
broadened to include a range of emotions – including hope and confidence – 
and to explore emotions that are present and/or activated as well as those that 
may be absent and/or deactivated (e.g., fear). The contemporary emphasis on 
understanding trust’s affective component leans more heavily on concepts of 
mutual affinity/caring and on interpersonal bonds (McAllister, 1995).   
 
The affective component of trust is based on shared goals, beliefs, values, and 
even identities among the parties.  The trustor not only understands, but often 
shares the trustee’s world view and factors that shape her or his behavior.  
They are “on the same page,” and this kindred connection creates, or at least 
reflects, an emotional bond between them.  McAllister (1995) would refer to 
this as affective-based trust.  Shapiro et al. (1992) would call it identification-
based trust.  Both draw on the affective drivers of trust decisions –often as 
appraisals of a trustee’s benevolence – and, again, are arguably very similar 
concepts. 
 
A research team led by Dr. Jason Colquitt, a Professor of Business 
Administration at University of Florida, analyzed a large compilation of studies 
from the trust literature, using 132 independent study samples.  They found 
that the primary three dimensions of trustworthiness - along with individual 
dispositions to trust and emotional response to the trustee – comprise the 
major determinants of trust (Colquitt, Scott, and LePine, 2007).  More 
importantly, they also found that the big three trustworthiness factors not only 
predicted trust behaviors but also significantly predicted people’s affective 
commitment.  Affective commitment is one’s desire to be part of a collective or 
group because of social and emotional bonds, not just for the tangible 
incentives (Shore, et al., 2006).  The trustworthiness triad was so robust that it 
predicted trust behaviors and bonds even with different trust measures, with a 
wide range of trustees, and in different kinds of relationships. 
Affective 
Component of 
Trust 
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Trust Over Time 
 
Swift trust is a concept that describes the kind of trust that 
is required in environments in which there is little or no 
time to develop trust among persons over longer periods 
of time.  However, “swift trust” has been a bit vexing in 
social science literature because different researchers have used the term to 
refer to very different behaviors. The origin of the “swift trust” concept, 
however, describes a dynamic that occurs in temporary or short-term working 
groups (Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996).   Unlike the traditional notion of 
trust being based in social exchange and rational choice, “swift trust” is a 
perceptual shortcut used by temporary working dyads or groups, which allows 
them to behave cooperatively without first building relationships, especially 
when operating under time constraints. This sometimes happens when a team 
is assembled rapidly in response to an unexpected event, or when a new 
person is inserted into an existing team.  
 
The term “swift trust” appears to trace back to Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer 
(1996) who suggest that “the trust that unfolds in temporary systems is more 
accurately portrayed as a unique form of collective perception and relating, 
that is capable of managing issues of vulnerability, uncertainty, risk, and 
expectations”  (p. 167).  If time is short and the group is temporary, it may not 
be feasible for members to spend time learning about each other, proving 
themselves, and building relationships before deciding to cooperate.  To 
manage the ambiguity of vulnerability and risk, the temporary group members 
often use others’ roles – rather than their individual personalities - to satisfy 
their sense of trust (Dionisi & Brodt, 2008). 
 
Some have used the term “swift trust,” however, to refer generically to 
situations in which a trustor quickly – and likely without conscious deliberation 
– perceives an introduced trustee as being trustworthy.  This might happen 
because a person possesses a high degree of trust propensity, but it may also 
be driven by situational and contextual factors, or even features of the trustee 
and her or his trustworthiness (not all of which may actually predict 
trustworthiness, of course).    In the organizational literature, this has been 
referred to as spontaneous trust, to distinguish it from generated trust (Hardy, 
Phillips, & Lawrence, 1998).  Spontaneous trust “refers to situations where 
trusting relationships emerge ‘naturally’ or instinctively in the absence of any 
deliberate intent or intervention to create them” (p. 78). 
 
 
Some researchers (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; 1996) argue 
that trust based on cognitive or affective factors not only 
comprise distinct types of trust, but mark developmental stages of trust that 
evolve over the course of a relationship.  According to this approach, all 
interpersonal trust begins with a calculus-based assessment of the benefits of 
behaving in a trustworthy way, weighed against the costs of betrayal.  For 
Swift Trust & 
Spontaneous 
Trust 
Stages of Trust 
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some relationships, this rational basis of trust is all that is required or may be 
as far as trust will develop.  The relationship scope may be limited, there may 
be little risk, or conversely reputation or actual trust violations may preclude 
any deeper relationship-based appraisal.   
 
Because many of the cognitive factors that can influence trust decisions are 
founded on a deeper knowledge of the other person and the stability of the 
other’s behavior across time and contexts, it is perhaps more likely to occur 
only in extended relationships.  Dr. Denise Rousseau, a Professor of 
Organizational Behavior at Carnegie Mellon University, suggests that over time 
the rational calculus typically becomes less important and the relational basis 
of trust becomes more important (Rousseau et al., 1998).   
 
In a staged model like this, trust’s affective drivers ostensibly build on each 
party’s knowledge of the other, shared experiences, proximity, and cooperative 
efforts – typically in a small subset of relationships – to form an emotional bond 
or connection between the parties that seals their trust.  Progressing to a more 
affective or relational basis for trust may involve a “transformation of 
motivation” (Kelly, 1984) where the parties move from a primary view of 
distinct self-interests to one of joint outcomes.  This raises important practical 
questions of whether affect-based trust is more resilient to violations than 
cognitive-based trust, or whether it is more vulnerable to transgressions, and 
less likely to be repaired once ruptured?   
 
RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY IN MEASUREMENTS 
 
Within the psychological sciences, the terms reliability and validity have very specific 
meanings in characterizing measurements. 
   
Reliability refers to the consistency or stability of a measure.  If you measure the same 
thing (or person) multiple times with the same measuring tool under the same conditions, 
you would hope to get similarly consistent results each time.  That would indicate the 
measuring tool was stable and reliable.  However, this is no guarantee that what you are 
measuring is valid.  For example, a ruler which is marked incorrectly will always give the 
same (wrong) measurement. It is very reliable, but not very valid. 
 
Validity refers to the extent to which a device or tool measures what it claims to measure – 
for example, whether a measure of trust is actually measuring trust, as opposed to 
something else like risk-taking, social influence, etc.  While less common, a measure may 
be valid but not reliable.  Some have charged that the Myers-Briggs Type Inventory 
personality test is an example of a valid, but unreliable, measurement.  That is, the Myers-
Briggs is actually measuring certain aspects of personality, but they are not reliable 
dimensions, since personality is not a wholly fixed construct.  So repeated MBTI tests on the 
same person – even under similar circumstances - will give different answers.  Hence, while 
the MBTI appears to be validly measuring things like a person’s degree of extraversion and 
conscientiousness, those measures will not be reliable due to different influences (such as 
mood or priming) on these dimensions of personality.    
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Defining Trust in Experiments  
 
Despite having a voluminous library of rich, eloquent prose describing and 
defining trust, its types, and its components, to study it empirically, researchers 
must find a way to measure it in some discrete scale or task.   
 
Some researchers measure trust by participants’ scores 
on a psychometric test or instrument.  Typically, these 
instruments contain a series of items that participants rate on a Likert-type 
scale; for example, responding to the statement:  “I can confide in and rely on 
my co-workers” – with a 1-4 rating of agreement ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).  One serious problem with this type of research 
is that many trust-related studies employ trust measures that are inconsistent 
with their chosen definition (Gillespie, 2003).  Researchers have conducted a 
couple of broad research reviews of trust scales and measures (Dietz & den 
Hartog, 2006; McEvily & Tortoriello, 2005), but none suggest that any 
particular scale is emerging as a gold standard.  One large review (McEvily & 
Tortoriello, 2005) found that only 11 of 119 identified trust measures had been 
used in more than one study and that most studies provided little, if any, 
evidence that the scale was actually measuring trust.   Other researchers have 
called for more “deep” qualitative measurement of trust using diaries, 
interviews, and communication analyses (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 
1990; Butler, 1991; Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1999; Wilson, Straus, & McEvily, 
2006). 
 
 
Examples of Trust Scales 
 
Scales to measure trust have been developed generally for research in 
organizational behavior, not specifically for field applications where individuals 
are highly motivated to assess and/or develop trust within high stress 
environments.   The measures are largely self-report, paper-and-pencil 
inventories composed of items that tap one or more elements or examples of 
interpersonal trust.  On most of the measures, respondents use a five- 
(sometimes a seven-) point response scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) 
to 5 (Strongly Agree), to rate their agreement with each item. 
 
• Schoorman, Mayer, and Davis (2007) have been working since at least 
1996 on a scale to measure the respondent’s willingness (voluntarily) 
to be vulnerable to a potential trustee. The most recent working version 
of the “general willingness to be vulnerable” scale, has five items 
(Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007); for example:  
 
“It is important for me to have a good way to keep an eye on my 
supervisor” 
 
“Increasing my vulnerability to criticism by my supervisor would 
be a mistake.”  
Trust Scales 
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• Mayer and Davis (1999) have developed a set of scales to test 
employees’ perceptions of management’s competence (6 items), 
benevolence (5 items) and integrity (6 items).  For example: 
 
Ability 
 
“Top management is very capable of performing its job.” 
 
 
Benevolence 
 
“Top management is very concerned about my welfare.”  
 
 
Integrity 
 
“I never have to worry whether top management will 
stick to its word.”  
 
• McAllister (1995) has developed an 11-item measure of affect- and 
cognition-based trust scales, to provide an example of multiple 
types/components/stages. Respondents rate their agreement with each 
item on a 7-point scale as they relate to a specific peer at work. For 
example: 
 
Affect-Based Trust 
 
“We have a sharing relationship. We can both freely 
share our feelings, ideas, and hopes.” 
 
Cognition-Based Trust 
 
“This person approaches his/her job with 
professionalism and dedication.”  
 
 
An alternative to using surveys and scales is to create a 
task that requires people to execute (or not) trusting 
behaviors and choices. There is little empirical evidence, 
however, that these experimental tasks reflect the concept of trust and its 
complexity as it is described in the conceptual literature.  This puts a different 
lens on defining interpersonal trust.  In a neurophysiological study of trust, for 
example, even if the measures of brain activity and physiological response 
patterns were perfectly accurate, if the experimental task is not driven by or 
does not reflect trust then it would lack validity - even if it is named a “trust 
task”. 
 
Trust 
Behaviors 
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One of the most common research approaches to measuring trust in human 
transactions is through the use of behavioral games (Camerer, 2003).  
Emblematic of this approach is a sequential social dilemma game called the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (Poundstone, 1992).   
 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 
 
There are several modern variants of the game, but the classic prisoner’s 
dilemma scenario, as created by mathematician and game theorist Albert 
Tucker, involves two criminal 
offenders who have been arrested 
and are being separately detained.  
Authorities offer an identical deal (or 
set of contingencies) independently to 
each offender.  Without knowing the 
other’s choice, each offender must 
choose whether to testify - or refuse 
to testify - against his partner.  If one 
agrees to testify against the other 
(“defecting”), but the other refuses to 
testify against his counterpart 
(“cooperating”) the defector goes free 
and the cooperator receives the 
maximum 10-year sentence. If both 
refuse to testify, both will be sentenced to only six months in jail for a minor 
charge. If both defect, however, both receive five-year sentences.  
 
Payoffs in the prisoner’s dilemma are structured so that the highest payoff 
occurs when one participant cooperates and the other defects, with the 
cooperating partner losing a substantial amount, while the defecting 
partner gains a substantial amount. The lowest payoff occurs, however, if 
both partners defect.  If both partners cooperate, each will benefit more 
than if both defect. Though the classic game uses a static “one-time” 
scenario, variations often allow for multiple 
iterations with a single partner (creating the 
opportunity to punish someone for defecting 
or to change decisions over time as a result 
of the other’s actions), changes in the payoff 
matrix, or providing information to one 
participant about the decision of the other.  
 
 
The Ultimatum Game 
 
The Ultimatum Game is another commonly 
used behavioral game in trust-related 
research. In this paired-player game, Player 
One is given an initial endowment of points 
or money, and allowed to choose whether or 
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not to give any portion of that initial endowment to Player Two.  If Player 
One makes an offer, Player Two can then either accept or reject the 
proposed division. If Player Two rejects the offer, however, neither player 
gets anything. In theory, the Player Two should accept any proposal that 
affords her or him any portion of the initial endowment, because some 
payoff is better than no payoff. In practice, many players will reject an offer 
that is not perceived as “fair” – that is, close to a 50% division of the initial 
endowment. 
 
 
The Trust Game 
 
The Trust Game is another popular experimental task.  This is also a 
paired-player game, with one player 
designated as “the investor”, and the 
other as “the trustee.” Both players 
are given an initial endowment of 
points or money. The investor is 
allowed to choose whether or not to 
give any portion of her/his 
endowment to the trustee.  If the 
investor chooses to bestow money 
on the trustee, the trustee will receive 
triple the shared amount (e.g., if the 
investor gives $10, the trustee 
receives a total of $30). The trustee 
is then allowed to choose whether or 
not to return some portion of the 
received amount to the investor. This game can play out over single or 
multiple iterations (e.g. Kosfeld, et al., 2005). 
 
Based purely on a rational economic appraisal of utility, because there is 
no guarantee of cooperation, it makes sense for the investor not to pass 
any of the original endowment to the trustee.  In fact, this tends to be the 
way the game plays out when the game has only one iteration/transaction 
or has multiple iterations but no opportunity to punish players for non-
cooperative behavior. When game conditions allow players to punish a 
non-cooperative participant, however, cooperative behavior tends to 
increase, with investors passing all or nearly all of their initial endowment to 
the trustee, and trustees returning the “fair” share of their payoff to the 
investor (e.g., DeQuervain et al., 2004).  
 
 
 
Social dilemma games are particularly favored by 
researchers who view trust as a purely economic decision, 
because the utilities (or payoffs) of each decision can be 
very clearly specified. There are open questions, however, 
about the extent to which these games are measuring 
interpersonal trust.   
Limitations in 
Social 
Dilemma 
Games 
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First, there is an obvious question of what 
researchers call “ecological validity”: how well 
do hypothetical decisions and behaviors in 
contrived game simulations reflect any kind of 
“real world” issues of trust (Zak & Ochsner, 
2009)?  Researchers who use these games 
acknowledge that "some of the everyday 
meanings of trust and trusting behavior are, no 
doubt, not captured by [the Prisoner's Dilemma] 
framework" (Orbell, Dawes, and Schwartz-Shea, 
1994, p.112).  A recent compilation of 84 
published studies worldwide using the trust 
game found that approximately 40% of the 
variance in trust and 30% of the variance in 
trustworthiness were explained solely by 
changes to the experimental protocols (Johnson 
& Mislin, 2008), suggesting that the games may 
be more sensitive to the contrived condition of 
exchange than to the concept of trust itself. 
 
Second, even if the games do approximate or generalize to real world 
behaviors, can “reciprocity,” “cooperation” or “collaboration” as defined in the 
game be reasonably used as a proxy for trust (Van den Bos et al., 2009)?  Can 
trust exist without cooperation or can cooperative choices be made without 
trust?  One might easily argue that cooperation is more common and more 
easily acquired than trust in dynamic environments where individuals or groups 
are highly motivated to achieve their goals and the consequences for not 
reaching them is also high.  How do the potential consequences to the partner 
(as opposed to self) affect the decision; and how might an appraisal of those 
consequences be affected by the nature of the relationship between partners? 
Performance in social dilemma games would appear to be – at best - a very 
indirect and highly confounded measure of interpersonal trust.   It would be 
useful to see new experimental tasks with greater ecological validity and more 
specificity in the measurement of trust. 
          ECOLOGICAL   
   VALIDITY 
 
Ecological validity is a type of 
validity referring to the 
degree to which the 
methods, setting, and 
activities associated with an 
experiment approximate how 
it operates in the real world.  
Ecological validity also 
reflects the degree to which 
the results from any 
experiment will generalize to 
the real world.  
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Mechanisms & Signals of 
Trust 
Though people may make certain choices based solely on a rational, cost-benefit 
analysis, social factors often drive decisions about interpersonal trust. These socially-
based decisions may initially seem “irrational,” but understanding their 
psychological and neurophysiological bases will help to reveal how and why trust 
emerges in a particular circumstance.   
 
 
 
1. Research suggests that people cannot accurately describe the 
methods or information they use to make trust decisions.  In fact, too 
much internal reflection and deliberation may make the process less 
efficient and less accurate. 
2. Humans often use “heuristics” or mental short cuts - primarily 
unconsciously - to simplify and speed-up complex interpersonal 
decisions, like those involving trust.  While these shortcuts may work 
for specific purposes, they can lead to systematic biases and errors in 
decision making.  
3. Two complementary neural systems appear to affect human trust 
decisions: an automatic system that works quickly but learns slowly, is 
driven by emotions, and doesn’t do well handling unusual 
circumstances; and a controlled system that operates more slowly but 
learns more quickly, is more deliberative and driven by reasoning, and 
that adapts well to exceptional circumstances. Both systems can and 
do contribute to trust decisions, and reflect underlying anatomical 
differences in how information is processed in the brain. 
Section 
3 
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4. Techniques used to record activity of the brain have helped to identify 
those structures that are involved in certain trust-related processes like 
empathy, acquiring social knowledge, and decision-making.  
5. A variety of chemicals in the brain also play a role in trust. One that has 
achieved particular prominence is oxytocin, a neuropeptide that seems 
to facilitate social engagement and to increase a person’s willingness 
to accept interpersonal vulnerability.   
6. Psychologically, interpersonal trust decisions tend to be driven by our 
perceptions of others’ trustworthiness, as a function of their ability, 
benevolence, and integrity. 
7. Behavioral norms and expectations vary across different kinds of 
relationships and situations. 
8. Group membership and relational status affect trust decisions. We are 
more likely to trust others whom we identify as being part of our “in-
group” or with whom we share a close social relationship, even when 
their actual behavior and individual characteristics may not merit such 
trust. 
here can be no simple, formulaic, or even typical description of how 
trust works. Because trust is complex and fluid the mechanisms by 
which it is formed and changes may vary based on characteristics of 
the trustor, the trustee, their behavior and experiences with each other 
over time, and characteristics of the context and setting. Over the past two 
decades, the scientific community has been learning more about the neural 
and psychological mechanisms of human social behaviors - including whether 
particular processes are stable or strongly affected by situational factors, and 
whether some mechanisms are more universal and others more sensitive to 
individual and cultural differences.  Identifying mechanisms and signals related 
to trust is the focus of this second generation research on interpersonal trust.  
 
The mechanisms of trust have been broadly classified according to two 
traditions of inquiry (Kramer, et al., 1999): (1) the behavioral tradition of trust, 
which views trust as rational-choice behavior, such as cooperative choices in a 
game (Hardin, 1993; Williamson, 1981); and (2) the psychological tradition of 
trust, which attempts to understand the complex intrapersonal states 
associated with trust, including expectations, intentions, affect, and 
dispositions (Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998).  
Having discussed trustworthiness in the previous section, this section focuses 
on the mechanisms and signals of interpersonal trust involved in the decision-
making of the trustor, and how such decisions are affected by the nature of the 
relationship and behaviors between the parties involved. 
 
T 
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Trustor 
 
The mechanism of trust – as conceived in the behavioral 
tradition – is based on a rational choice model and rooted 
in the concept of social exchange (Blau, 1964; Dionisi & 
Brodt, 2008; Homans, 1958).  Consistent with the homo 
economicus or “rational man” assumptions of classical economics, the rational 
choice model suggests that “people are motivated to maximize their personal 
gains and minimize their personal losses in social interactions, and react to 
other individuals, organizations, authorities, and rules from a self-interested 
perspective” (Kramer & Tyler 1996, p.1). This is the central assumption in 
social exchange theory as well – that people constantly weigh costs and 
benefits and make decisions based on which side outweighs the other (Blau, 
1964; Homans, 1958).   Trust based on social exchange also has a dynamic, 
developmental component.  It evolves over time and across transactions as 
information about outcomes (e.g., whether the trustee cooperated or betrayed 
the trust) feeds back into the trustor’s ongoing trust appraisal (Weber, et al., 
2005). This purely utilitarian, rational model has also been referred to as 
deterrence-based trust (Shapiro, et al., 1992) when focused only on avoiding 
the “cost” of betrayal, and calculus-based trust (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; 1996) 
when decision making weighs those costs against the “benefits” of 
trustworthiness. 
 
While it appears to be true that people generally have the capacity for rational, 
calculated, self-interested decision making under certain circumstances, this is 
not their only mechanism, and very often it is not the dominant one.  As recent 
research is demonstrating, people are often not very accurate at knowing what 
factors affect the decisions they make or describing how their decisions are 
made.  Their behavioral patterns are not totally unsystematic or unpredictable, 
but they do not always follow the prescribed rules of rational choice.   Again, it 
may be that people are best understood as being neither rational nor irrational, 
but as social. 
 
This is likely to be as true for trust decisions as it is for a range of other choices 
that people make. If you just ask people whether, how and why they trust 
someone, they will likely respond with a sincere rational \ post-hoc account, 
but, when researched using controlled experiments, it is clear that such 
descriptions often have little to do with the reality of how humans decide and 
behave.  
 
Despite the popularity of analogies and metaphors that compare the brain to a 
computer, the human brain is functionally not well-equipped for complex 
configural analyses of information or for context-free decision making.  The 
brain tends to compensate for these limitations by simplifying the decision 
points or using mental shortcut decision rules, sometimes called “heuristics” 
(Kahneman, 1991, 1994; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982).   
 
How Do We 
Decide to Trust 
or Distrust? 
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These systematic biases and mental shortcuts have been observed and 
extensively studied for more than 75 years, and some of them that apply to 
cost-benefit decisions are the focus of behavioral economist Dan Ariely’s 
popular book:  Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our 
Decisions (Ariely, 2009).  One can also find these inconsistencies in 
experimental trust studies such as in the Ultimatum Game when recipients 
reject an offer and knowingly choose to get nothing because they perceive the 
division of funds to be unfair (Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1986), and would 
rather sacrifice their own gain in order to punish others.   
 
Without reviewing the dozens of short cuts and processes (the “heuristics”) 
that affect our decisions (see Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982), three 
general cognitive trends are worth mentioning here as they relate to our 
decisions about interpersonal trust.   
 
 
 
Our limited brains, in order to function efficiently, 
attempt to simplify our complex world.   
 
When faced with a decision about trust, there is an almost limitless amount of 
data available to us that could affect our choices.  Most humans have neither 
the time nor mental computational capacity to process it all, nor to assess what 
is relevant and what is irrelevant.  So the brain tends to pick out what it deems 
most salient and to cluster chunks of information together – or to use some 
factors as proxies for others – in order to make the best decision possible 
under the circumstances.  Unsurprisingly, then, much research suggests that 
the best possible human decision is nearly always suboptimal – both in terms 
of accuracy and the process by which the judgment is rendered (Kahneman, 
1991).   
 
Research on the social psychology and social neuroscience of stereotyping 
behaviors illustrates how these simplifying mechanisms sometimes work, 
particularly in people's judgments based on features like appearance, race and 
gender.  Researchers have presented subjects with pictures of strangers’ 
faces.  Some faces are consistently rated as being more trustworthy than 
others (Todorov, 2008).  In fact, very high levels of agreement emerge about 
what untrustworthy people “should” look like.  The brain uses those cues to 
render a quick judgment within 150 milliseconds (Engell et al, 2007; Todorov et 
al, 2009).  Those consensus impressions, however, tend not to correspond to 
the pictured persons' actual trust-related behavior or their trustworthiness for 
any specific environment (Engell et al, 2007; Gordon & Platek, 2009). The 
untrustworthy valence also evokes an automatic emotional response.  When a 
person views an untrustworthy face, the brain’s amygdala (fear center) is 
activated, and this is true even when the person is not first primed to assess 
the other’s trustworthiness (Breiter et al., 1996; Frith & Frith, 2006; Frith & 
Singer, 2008).   
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These processes can carry over into various forms of prejudice as well 
(Jenkins, et al., 2009). Prior studies have shown the amygdala to react more to 
“negative attitude” stimuli than to “positive attitude” stimuli, and across studies, 
even with different methods, when Caucasian or African American research 
subjects are presented with the picture of an African American person, the 
amygdala is often activated (Eberhardt, 2005; Ito & Bartholow, 2009; Ito, et al., 
2006; Lieberman, et al., 2005; Wheeler & Fiske, 2005). The degree of 
activation varies somewhat from subject-to-subject and is statistically related to 
implicit (unconscious) measures of prejudice, but not to explicit measures of 
prejudice - an example of how conscious appraisals of our own cognitive 
processes are often at variance with our actual behavior and our implicit 
attitudes (Ito & Barthlow, 2009).   
 
In a study of gender-based perceptions and trust, Orbell and colleagues (1994) 
assigned judges to predict whether players would cooperate or defect in a 
“trust” social dilemma game.  Both male and female judges predicted the 
female player would cooperate much more often than male players, though 
this expectation was not confirmed in the player’s actual performance. The 
judges did not explicitly use gender as a basis for their predictions or for 
choosing whether to play the game with a particular individual.  This could 
simply reflect an implicit bias, but it could also suggest that the stereotypic 
biases about gender did not necessarily drive individual choices – or at least 
that they were sublimated by other factors (Orbell et al., 1994). 
 
When humans get too deliberative in analyzing their decision process, they 
often fail to accurately reflect on how the decision is made.  When they try to 
add more options and incorporate more information and data points into their 
decisions, the outcomes may become less, rather than more, accurate.  A 
recent study found that people were able to accurately identify psychopaths 
from a 5 second video clip, but that longer clips (more information) did not 
improve – and in some case reduced - their accuracy. These participants also 
performed comparably well when given only nonverbal cues or only verbal 
cues, but more poorly when given both together (Fowler, et al., 2009).  The 
brain’s simplifying shortcuts are not perfect, and not always economically 
rational, but more often than not, in day-to-day decisions, they serve our 
interests reasonably well.  
 
Human brains are wired to make decisions about 
options and value based on comparisons, not in 
absolute terms.  
  
When meeting a stranger, our mental computer is not just uploading and 
calculating variables like attractiveness, likeability, and facial expressions in 
relation to some absolute criteria or gold standard.  It is appraising 
characteristics in relative terms by comparing them to some other person, 
option, or mental representation, including our own self.  The explicit question 
of whether this person is trustworthy is built on an answer to the tacit question 
of “relative to what/whom?” This suggests that judgments may change based 
on the point of comparison, or frame of reference (Tversky & Kahneman, 
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1981).  Indeed, this is what researchers consistently find both in consumer 
choices and interpersonal appraisals.  Comparisons and “framing” guide the 
decisions.  
 
Framing and comparison effects also may affect our decisions by evoking 
emotions. Here's a classic example:  A group of people are given a scenario in 
which 600 people are in peril, and they must decide between two courses of 
action.  Half are given the first frame:  “Option A will save 200.” The other half 
are give an alternative frame:  “Option A will allow 400 people to die.”  The 
phrasing of the first emphasizes the number of lives saved, while the 
alternative frame emphasizes the number of deaths.  The actual probabilities 
are identical, but more people choose Option A with the first frame than with its 
alternative (Kühberger, 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).   A team of 
researchers (De Martino, et al., 2006) used this task in an fMRI study and 
found each of the two frames produced different patterns of activation in the 
amygdala- a region involved in processing emotional and social information, 
and correlated strongly with the chosen course of action, suggesting emotions 
were responsible for the framing effect.  Interestingly, however, task-related 
activity in the brain's higher level thinking and reasoning areas (the prefrontal 
cortex) mitigated susceptibility to the framing effect. 
 
 
 
Our expectations affect our judgments and outcomes.   
 
Our expectations are often built on a set of tacit or implicit 
assumptions, which may not be perfectly rational, but do simplify our 
decisions.  Studies show, for example, that people report much more pain 
relief from taking a pill (placebo) when told it costs $2.50 than when told it 
costs only a dime.  Why?  Generally higher quality items cost more, so 
humans carry the implicit notion that “you get what you pay for.”   
 
The effects of our expectations carry over into all kinds of interpersonal 
decisions in various ways.  For example, if we believe a person does not like 
us, we are more inclined to interpret how they look at us or what they say as 
being negative or hostile than if the same look or words came from a friend.  
This is one example of what decision researchers call confirmatory bias 
(Evans, 1989; Rabin & Schrag, 1999). Because the brain is looking for ways to 
simplify information and for benchmarks (even if arbitrary) to make 
comparisons, what we “find” in our environments tends to be guided by what 
we expect to find.  This suggests that what we know of people's reputations is 
very likely to affect our appraisals of their trustworthiness.  Indeed, prior 
studies have found that an untrustworthy reputation evokes feelings of distrust 
(Deutsch, 1960; Lewicki & Bunker, 1995, 1996). 
 
This effect is not always maladaptive or counter-productive.  In some 
circumstances, it may accelerate our ability to cooperate with others.  Humans 
generally learn (and acquire social knowledge) about other people over time 
as they interact with them, and as they observe them interacting in turn with 
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others.  Through those observations, humans come to assign a positive or 
negative value to the other person (Frith & Singer, 2008).  In social dilemma 
games with multiple iterations, people not only learn who is a cooperator and 
who is a defector, but they also come to like the former and dislike the latter.  
Each person's earned status creates a reputation that generalizes to her or his 
likeability, which has been shown to shape the perception of their 
trustworthiness.   
 
 
Social cognitive neuroscientists have used imaging 
technologies to examine what happens in the brain when 
deciding whether to trust.  In most of the studies, the 
researchers observe images of brain activity while 
participants are engaged in various social dilemma 
games.  When people engage with cooperators, their 
brains show a very different response pattern than when 
they engage with defectors.  Engaging with a defector, not 
surprisingly, tends to activate the brain’s fear center – the amygdala (Singer et 
al., 2004a).  
 
The brain also tends to respond somewhat differently based on whether the 
other player’s 
cooperation or 
defection is 
intentional or not.   
One study, for 
example, compared 
brain activity patters 
among persons 
engaged with 
intentional 
cooperators to those 
engaged with non-
intentional 
cooperators. Both 
kinds of cooperators 
behaved the same 
way.  The only 
difference was in their 
perceived intentions.  
But people’s brains 
responded differently 
to the faces of 
intentional than non-
intentional co-
operators.  The nature of those differences in brain activation suggests 
“subjects were not simply learning which faces were associated with reward. 
They were learning whom to trust” (Frith & Frith, 2006, p. 38).   
 
What Happens 
in the Brain 
When We 
Decide 
Whether to 
Trust?  
TRUST IN THE BRAIN
 
Many areas of the brain play a role in supporting trust-related 
processes, including the amygdala, prefrontal cortex, anterior 
cingulate cortex, caudate nucleus, and putamen, pictured here. 
The specific functions of each area are described in more detail 
within this section. 
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Confirmatory biases and reputation-based expectations, however, can 
sometimes override interpersonal experiential learning.  One study used an 
iterative trust game in which participants were given a “bio” of their counterpart 
player, presenting either a neutral, a praiseworthy, or a morally suspect history 
of behavior (Delgado, Frank, & Phelps, 2005).   In reality – across all three 
conditions – the counterpart partners played with a 50% cooperation/ 
reinforcement schedule.   
 
A part of the brain that guides future decisions based on prior reward feedback 
(the striatum) was generally activated in participants when the partner 
cooperated or defected, most likely representing reward-based trial and error 
learning.  But significant activation of the striatum was only observed when 
participants thought they were playing with the morally “neutral” partner, not 
when playing the morally “good” partner.  In fact, as people played the game 
through multiple iterations – even though they only achieved “cooperation” half 
the time – participants persistently made more risky choices when they thought 
the partner had a good moral reputation.  Thus, prior expectations about an 
individual drove their judgments and in some cases inhibited their ability to 
learn from their experiences (Delgado, Frank, & Phelps, 2005).  
 
Automatic and Controlled Processing Systems 
 
The human brain has two powerful, but somewhat distinct, systems for 
processing information, one of which is more automatic and the other more 
controlled (Loewenstein, 2000; Engel & Singer, 2008); both are important for 
understanding interpersonal trust (Winston, et al., 2002).  The automatic 
system operates quickly and spontaneously, taking inputs simultaneously from 
multiple sensory channels, while the controlled system operates more slowly 
and intentionally to reflectively consider information in a stepwise fashion.  
    
 
Different names have been used to refer to these automatic and controlled 
systems:  Reflexive and Reflective; X-System and C-System (Lieberman, 
2007; Satpute & Lieberman, 2006); bottom-up and top-down (Ochsner, et al., 
2009); and Low Road and High Road (Goleman, 2006).  It is a “dual process” 
Automatic Controlled 
Reflexive 
X-System 
Bottom-Up 
Reflective 
C-System 
Top-Down 
Driven my emotion/intuition Driven by logic/reason 
Fast operation  Slow operation 
Less affected by cognitive load Affected by cognitive load 
Efficient under conditions of high physiological  
arousal 
Less efficient under conditions of high 
physiological arousal 
Sensitive to subliminal influences Less susceptible to subliminal influences 
Insensitive to nuances and “exceptions to the 
rule” 
Sensitive to nuances and can handle  
“exceptions to the rule” 
Learns slowly Learns quickly 
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model (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Evans, 2003), with the automatic system being 
driven more by emotion/intuition and the controlled system more by logic and 
reason The dual process model involves more than just two discrete sets of 
neural pathways.  Both systems are affected by a range of hormones, 
neurochemicals, and perceptual factors, like the cognitive biases just 
described (Lieberman, 2007).  Each system can also affect the other.   
 
Each system has its own strengths and weaknesses and is better suited for 
some kinds of tasks or situations more than others.  The systems may conflict, 
but one is not necessarily the enemy of the other.  Research evidence 
suggests “decisions dictated by reason are not always good, while decisions 
dictated by emotion are not always bad” (Frith & Singer, 2008, p.3884).  
Though the automatic system is fast, unaffected by cognitive load, and works 
efficiently under conditions of high physiological arousal, it is also more 
sensitive to subliminal (outside of conscious awareness) influences, less 
sensitive to nuances and “exceptions to the rule,” and is much slower to learn.  
The controlled system, though slower, less efficient under high arousal, and 
more sensitive to cognitive load, is relatively unaffected by subliminal 
influences, learns more quickly, and handles “out of the ordinary” cases very 
well (Lieberman, 2007; Satpute & Lieberman, 2006). 
 
There is a dynamic interplay between the automatic and controlled systems 
that provides for a balance of influence.  Emotions tend to dominate our initial 
interpersonal impressions and our interpersonal predictions, so they may have 
the home field advantage but they don’t always win.  The controlled system 
can exercise a top-down override of biases and emotional impulses, so that we 
are not entirely subservient to our inclinations, impulses and predispositions 
(Rilling et al., 2007).  Those top-down controls keep our behavior in line and 
permit us to have more harmonious and productive social exchanges (Frith & 
Frith, 2006).  The rational-emotional balance is a critical component in 
regulating our social behavior – likely so with trust as well.  
 
The tension between reason and emotion in decision making is particularly 
important to understanding complex social behaviors such as trust (Han et al., 
2009).  Trust researchers have acknowledged for years that the rational and 
emotional aspects of trust often work together.  Nearly 25 years ago, it was 
observed that “trusting behavior may be motivated primarily by strong positive 
affect for the object of trust or by 'good rational reasons' why the object of trust 
merits trust, or, more usually, some combination of both. Trust in everyday life 
is a mix of feeling and rational thinking" (Lewis & Weigert, 1985, p. 972). 
 
The human brain and physiology are known to operate 
somewhat differently in social (interpersonal) than in non-
social contexts. In interpersonal trust transactions, 
humans attempt to read what the other person is trying to convey 
(communicative intent), while attempting to convey a trustworthy impression 
(Berg et al., 1995).  This effect does not occur, however, when they are 
interacting with a computer (McCabe et al., 2001; Rilling et al.  2004) or when 
outcomes are determined by an algorithm (for example, in an automated trust 
game) (Singer et al. 2004).  During an interpersonal trust game, for example, 
Deciding in 
Social Contexts 
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each player is simultaneously signaling and assessing trustworthiness (King-
Casas et al., 2005).  In our trust appraisals, to form expectations regarding 
another person’s behavior, we must be able to understand the other’s 
perspective through the lens of their own beliefs, intentions, and emotions.   
This typically occurs through a mix of sensory inputs and social cognitive 
processes, which appear to be unique to social/interpersonal interactions 
(McCabe et al., 2001; Rilling et al., 2004).  
  
Recent research suggests that humans use the same specific neural networks 
to process others’ mental and emotional states as when we are experiencing 
those states ourselves (Jackson et al., 2006; Morrison et al., 2007).  So, for 
example, if an individual is watching another person being afraid and trying to 
understand what he/she is feeling and experiencing, that individual will activate 
many of the same brain areas and pathways as if they were being directly 
frightened  (Frith & Singer, 2008).   The degree of activation, however, may 
depend on a variety of social factors, such as the individual’s general 
attitudes/feelings toward the other person and the extent to which they can 
identify with the other person.    
 
A variety of automatic and controlled processes are responsible both for our 
capacity to understand thoughts and feelings from another’s perspective and 
for these parallel or “shared” patterns of neural activity.  At the most 
fundamental, biological level, there is accumulating evidence that our own 
neural systems detect and mimic what we observe in others.  A recently 
popular hypothesis is that this is the effect of a mirror neuron system (Rizzolatti 
and Craighero, 2004). 
 
It is clear that the human brain is sensitive to 
social/interpersonal transactions. A trustor’s brain is 
affected by the mere presence of the potential trustee.  
The resulting brain activity will affect whether the individual decides to trust the 
other.  How do these socially-activated brain changes occur?  One possible 
mechanism is through mirror neurons.  Mirror neurons are a set of neurons 
that respond both when an individual performs a goal-directed action, and 
when observing another individual performing the same action. Neural 
pathways in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), ventral premotor cortex, inferior 
parietal cortex, and posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) seem to be 
particularly implicated in this type of activity (Iacoboni and Daprettto, 2006; 
Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). These neurons are believed to be crucial to 
human and non-human primate abilities to imitate others. Some suggest that 
they are also responsible for social contagion effects (such as yawn contagion) 
that occur when others’ feeling states, facial expressions and body postures 
cause our bodies to respond accordingly (Frith & Frith, 2006).   
 
Another revelation showing that these mirror systems are socially sensitive, 
not just reflexive, is that the extent of our mirror activation seems to depend on 
the degree of social engagement.  If a person moves while making eye contact 
with an observer, the observer will exhibit much stronger neural activation than 
if the actor was facing away from him (Kilner et al. 2006). Mirror neuron activity 
Mirror 
Neurons 
T H E  S C I E N C E  O F  I N T E R P E R S O N A L  T R U S T  
 33   
has primarily been studied in the context of intentional imitation of goal 
directed action. Very little data exist on the relationship between mirror 
neurons and nonverbal communication, most of which appears to be 
unconscious and non-cognitive. 
 
Humans (and their brains) – as noted in prior research 
(see p. 29) - not only respond to others’ behavior, but also 
to their intentions.    Empathic processes are a key part of how people assess 
others’ intentions.  These are the processes that allow us to understand and 
even share others’ emotional and feeling states (de Vignemont & Singer, 
2006).  Empathy occurs at an intermediate level on the automatic-controlled 
continuum.  Whereas social contagion effects occur unconsciously, when we 
empathize we are aware that our reactions and feeling states are prompted by 
someone else’s reactions and experiences (Lamm, et al., 2008).  We are – 
with awareness - viewing a situation from another person’s perspective. Our 
empathic responses are also socially sensitive.  The nature and extent of their 
activation can vary according to nature of the relationship, the situation, and 
how we perceive the other person (Akitsuki & Decety 2009).  Having a strong 
emotional bond with the other person may enhance our empathic activation 
(Singer et al. 2004a), but if we perceive the other person as being unfair or 
somehow deserving of pain or punishment, we may experience much less 
empathic activation (Lamm, et al. 2007; Singer, et al.,2006).  The degree of 
empathic response can also be modulated by the intensity of the stimulus we 
are observing (Avenanti et al. 2006). 
 
 
Mentalizing (also called Theory of Mind) invokes the very 
conscious and deliberate processes we use to infer or 
predict what others are thinking and feeling (Frith & Singer, 2008).  It’s what 
happens when we are thinking about what someone else may be thinking.  We 
know only a little from social neuroscience research about this process, and 
mostly in an indirect way.  In these studies, people are rarely interacting with 
another person.  Instead, they are typically shown a picture or story and asked 
to relate what the subject might be thinking or feeling (Hampton et al., 2008).  
These non-social actions are called “offline” tasks.  Brain imaging studies of 
mentalizing activity report fairly consistent findings, including – (a) activation of 
the pSTS, an area at the bottom and rear of the brain known to be active when 
we are evaluating others, and also associated with altruism and ethical/moral 
decision making, and (b) activity in the medial (referring to the area closest to 
the body’s centerline) prefrontal cortex (mPFC), an area in the front of the 
brain believed to help us discern the meaning of our emotions and experiences 
(Frith and Frith, 2003; Saxe et al., 2004).  In social dilemma game studies 
where participants are assigned either to play against a person or a computer, 
the mPFC is activated during inter-person play, but not during person-
computer interaction (McCabe et al., 2001; Rilling et al., 2004).  
 
 
Empathy 
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T H E  S C I E N C E  O F  I N T E R P E R S O N A L  T R U S T  
 34   
Two of the most common contemporary methods for 
measuring the neural basis of psychological processes 
such as trust are EEG and fMRI. EEG measures changes 
in electrical brain currents that occur when large groups of 
neurons in the outermost layer of the brain, the cortex, fire simultaneously. 
These changes are measured using electrodes placed on the surface of the 
scalp and face. Because EEG picks up electrical signals, it is a fairly direct and 
“real-time” measure of brain activity.   The signals are detected very near the 
time when the activity occurs. Because each EEG electrode covers a zone, 
however, it is not very precise in pinpointing highly focalized areas of activity.  
 
 
EEG and fMRI as Measures of Trust 
 
The powerful magnetic field in fMRI is 
used to detect changes in the ratio of 
oxygenated to deoxygenated 
hemoglobin in the brain’s blood flow.  
This ratio is known as a blood-
oxygenated level dependent (BOLD) 
response.  Oxygenated blood tends to 
flow into areas of the brain that are 
active, so changes in this oxygenation 
ratio correlate with changes in the 
surrounding level of neural activity.  
Unlike EEG, it does not measure 
neural firings directly.  fMRI is much better than EEG at isolating small areas of 
signal activity, but – because it is only measuring changes in oxygenated blood 
flow, and not neural electrical signals - it is also a more indirect, and somewhat 
delayed measure of brain activity.  EEG measures neural firings as they occur, 
but changes in blood flow take some time, perhaps even several seconds, 
after the neural response. fMRI is better than EEG at pinpointing location, but 
worse at pinpointing the timing of neural activity.  The two methods can be 
combined, but doing both simultaneously is technically and computationally 
demanding (Debener & Herrmann, 2008; Hermann and Debener, 2008; 
Moosman, et al., 2008; Varios et al., 2006) and doing them sequentially 
introduces variability that could confound the results.   
 
Several fMRI studies have identified patterns of BOLD response during games 
of trust and during judgments of trustworthiness based on facial expressions.  
Commonly activated brain areas include: the amygdala, anterior medial 
prefrontal cortex, paracingulate cortex, insula, ventral tegmental area, septal 
area, fusiform gyrus, superior temporal sulcus, and orbitofrontal cortex. 
 
Technical measurement aside, most neuroimaging and neurophysiological 
studies of trust to date have very little conceptual or theoretical foundation 
(some do not even define trust at all) and are profoundly lacking in ecological 
validity.  They use offline tasks or contrived social dilemma games, in which 
trust is inferred from cooperative behavior in a reciprocal exchange. Because 
of the constraints of cumbersome technology, nearly all are done in laboratory 
Detecting 
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environments.  Even if the neural measures were direct and highly precise, it is 
not at all clear that trust is what is causing the neural activation.   
 
Given that fMRI research thus far has not been able to identify consistent and 
specific signals for even basic emotions, (Barrett and Wagner, 2006) it should 
not be surprising that anything like a “trust center” in the brain” (if one exists) 
has eluded detection. Most neurophysiology and neuroscience techniques 
used in the study of trust provide only partial insight into the system as a 
whole. It is possible that techniques like psychoneuropharmacology and 
behavioral genetics, which address cognition and behavior at a systemic level, 
might hold promise in the investigation of large scale neural system 
interactions that are key to the development and maintenance of trust.  
 
 
Oxytocin 
 
Oxytocin (OT) is a neurochemical – technically a 
“neuropeptide hormone” - that has received a flood of popular attention over 
the past several years. It has even been hyperbolically described as the “trust 
hormone.” OT is a naturally occurring neuropeptide, found in most mammals, 
and in humans is synthesized in the hypothalamus (a part of the brain that 
connects the nervous and endocrine systems, serving as a control center for 
hormones and regulating behavioral circadian rhythms/patterns).  OT is 
implicated in a diverse array of physiological and psychological processes 
including birthing, lactation, sexual arousal, blood pressure, anxiety, and social 
behaviors (Gimpl & Fahrenholz, 2001; Barberis & Tribollet, 1996).  OT appears 
to facilitate the forming of social bonds and attachments (Carter, 1998; Insel & 
Young, 2001); to speed the healing of physical wounds; to enhance positive 
communications and perceived social support (Gouin, et al., 2010), and to 
mitigate the stress-response effects of social anxiety and social stressors 
(Heinrichs et al, 2003).   
 
In other experiments, studies have shown that administering OT (intra-nasally) 
can artificially increase its levels in the body, leading to increases in 
cooperative and trust-like behaviors (Baumgartner, et al., 2008; Kosfeld et al., 
2005).  Professor Ernst Fehr (Fehr, et al., 2005; Fehr, 2009, 2008) from the 
University of Zurich and Dr. Paul Zak (2008, 2007, 2005), director of the 
Center for Neuroeconomics Studies at Claremont Graduate University, have 
been at the center of efforts to explore the role of OT in interpersonal trust and 
relationships. In previous experiments using the Trust Game, researchers 
found that OT levels naturally and consistently rise in the receiving player who 
was given part of the endowment from the first player.  OT’s role in this signal 
of being trusted, therefore, was confirmed when researchers administered 
doses of OT, and players tended to show more reciprocity in their game 
behavior; that is, they were both more likely to give money back and to return a 
greater amount of their benefit to the other player.  With the boost of OT, 
reciprocity and generosity increases, even when risk-taking itself (e.g., playing 
“against the odds” in a gambling or probability task) does not change, 
Neurochemicals 
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suggesting OT’s effects are very specific and sensitive to the social context 
(Kosfeld et al., 2005). 
  
Following up on these findings, 
Professor Gregor Domes from the 
University of Zurich led a study 
(Domes et al., 2007b) exploring 
whether and how OT might affect a 
person’s ability to infer another’s 
internal state.  Recall, these tasks 
generally fall into the category of 
mentalizing or Theory of Mind. 
Though some colloquially refer to 
this as “mind reading,” that might 
overstate the process a bit.  
Reading others, however, is a 
regular and essential part of 
human social engagement 
generally, and because trust 
judgments are conditioned on our 
expectations of how others will 
behave, trying to gauge the 
motivations and intentions of 
others is likely to be a part of 
assessing whom to trust, with 
what, to what degree, and under 
what conditions.  Therefore, the 
fact that OT seems to improve the 
accuracy of this assessment is of 
particular interest, and was 
investigated further in a follow-on 
experiment. 
 
Domes and his colleagues used the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test” 
(RMET; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) in a rigorous double-blind, placebo-
controlled experiment. RMET was originally developed by researchers in the 
1990s to measure impairments in social mentalizing functions among people 
with autism spectrum disorders. RMET participants view a series of 
photographs, each depicting the area around a person’s eyes, and are asked 
to choose from a list of two to four words which best characterizes what the 
pictured person is thinking and feeling (Baron-Cohen, et al., 1997, 2001). The 
photos vary somewhat in their level of difficulty.  Domes and colleagues found 
that participants given intranasal OT performed significantly better on the 
RMET than those given the placebo, and that the difference was particularly 
apparent in the more complex or challenging inferences – more evidence of 
OT’s social specificity (Domes et al., 2007b).   
 
In a separate set of studies by the same researchers, subjects viewed 
snapshots of faces displaying angry, fearful, happy or neutral expressions. 
READING THE MIND IN THE EYES 
TEST STIMULI 
Baron-Cohen S. et al. (2001) 
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Males given OT showed a blunted response of the amygdala to anger, fear, 
and happiness, compared to placebo-treated males (Domes et al., 2007b). In 
another study, females were tested using the same pictures and an increase in 
amygdala activation was seen in the OT-treated females, but only when shown 
the fearful faces (Domes et al., 2010). These results further demonstrate the 
role of OT in processing emotional and social stimuli, but also the important 
interactions it may have with other neurochemicals, such as sex hormones, 
and how this may modulate neurophysiology and behavior. 
 
Another intriguing aspect of OT studies in human interaction is that there is a 
distinct subgroup of people – approximately 2% of their study participants – 
who almost never reciprocate and seem more impervious to OT’s socially 
facilitating effects.  Some have likened this group to “psychopaths” who tend to 
show callous, unemotional disregard for other people.   Researchers suggest 
that most people reciprocate conditionally – when the other player sends them 
more money, they return more money.  But these hardcore non-reciprocators 
don’t behave that way.  One might be inclined to think that perhaps, their 
brains - unlike most - aren’t releasing OT when they initially receive the money.  
Surprisingly, they find quite the opposite.   
 
OT’s normal release pattern is in tightly regulated bursts.  When the brain 
perceives a social cue of trust (like being given money in the Trust Game), its 
typical pattern is to quickly switch on OT production to release the chemical, 
then to quickly switch off again.  In the non-reciprocators, the automatic “off 
switch” doesn’t engage and they wind up with very high levels of peripheral 
OT.  Yet they don’t respond to OT like the others.  It doesn’t increase their 
reciprocity and cooperative behavior.  This has led scientists to wonder if 
perhaps the glitch among the hardcore non-reciprocators lies in their OT 
receptors, which may be abnormally upregulated or downregulated in specific 
regions of the brain or have structural or functional problems such that OT 
does not appropriately bind to the receptor. Additional research is needed to 
understand the effect of individual differences in the oxytocinergic system on 
social decision-making processes.  
 
 
Vasopressin 
 
Vasopressin is a peptide hormone with a chemical structure very similar to that 
of OT, and also synthesized primarily in the hypothalamus (Skuse and 
Gallagher, 2009). Vasopressin expression is modulated by genetic 
mechanisms on the X- or Y-chromosomes and may promote somewhat 
different responses in men than in women. Like most hormones and 
neurochemicals, vasopressin has multiple effects and functions.  Though it 
acts as an antidiuretic, and is involved in regulating blood pressure, it has also 
been associated with male-typical social behaviors, including aggression, pair 
bonding, scent marking, and courtship (Heinrichs et al., 2009). Centrally active 
vasopressin seems generally to be associated with increased vigilance, 
anxiety, arousal, and activation.  Interestingly, increases in OT usually 
suppress vasopressin.  
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Dopamine 
 
Dopamine (DA) is one of the most important neurochemicals in the brain’s 
reward system (Badgaiyan, et al., 2009).  The dopaminergic system modulates 
emotion – such as fear – and regulates the brain’s perceptions of reward, 
particularly in social behavior. DA serves many other functions as well from 
pleasure seeking to detecting disruptive or disturbing environmental changes, 
and even selective information processing (Pani, Porcella, & Gassa, 2000). 
Dopamine has somewhat different effects when it is distributed in different 
areas of the brain.  Its circuits in the upper (dorsal) striatum, which includes the 
caudate nucleus and putamen, for example, can help us to monitor the 
outcomes of our actions in order to facilitate reward-based learning. 
Dopaminergic circuits in the lower (ventral) striatum can help anticipate or 
predict whether reward will result from a future action.  In the case of 
interpersonal trust, fear is often prompted by a belief or feeling that the other 
person will either act against our expectations, against our interests, or both.  
Reward, on the other hand, occurs when our positive expectations about the 
other’s behavior are met.  In that way, Dopamine contributes physiologically to 
our decisions about when, with whom, and under what circumstances we 
should be vulnerable to another, and helps us to learn from our trust 
experiences and our assessments of others’ trustworthiness.   
 
 
The striatum 
 
The striatum – which includes the 
caudate nucleus, putamen, 
and nucleus accumbens– 
plays a major role in the brain’s reward 
system.  This is primarily because of its role in 
regulating dopamine (DA), known to be a key 
chemical in the reward pathway.  Research 
studies have found that engaging in cooperative (or 
sometimes “justified” punishing) behavior stimulates 
activity in the striatum (DeQuervain, 2004; Rilling et al., 
2004). Conversely, activation in the striatum tends to precipitate 
cooperative behaviors (Caldu & Dreher, 2007), possibly in 
anticipation of a reward. Cooperation occurs when two or more people act 
toward a mutually beneficial outcome.  Rationally, cooperation only makes 
sense when it is reciprocated.  So, to use cooperation adaptively in situations 
of interpersonal trust, people need to be able to learn and to anticipate when 
they should and should not do it.  Dopamine pathways in the striatum help to 
regulate those signals and to facilitate adaptive learning about when to trust.  
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The amygdala 
 
The amygdala was once thought to be the brain’s 
center for fear-based emotional expression. 
Accumulating evidence supports a more general 
role for the amygdala in detecting threat and 
signaling reward, fear, and emotionally-laden 
social cues, and does so both for conscious, 
cognitively driven emotional responses and for 
unconscious and automatic responses like those of 
the autonomic nervous system (Adolphs, et al., 1998; 
Adolphs, 2008; Pessoa, 2008).   The amygdala is a key 
structure for context conditioning – an organism’s ability to 
locate and detect environments where reward has previously been or is 
likely to be found, and to avoid those without reward or where danger may be 
present (Le Doux, 2003). Studies using positron emission tomography (PET) 
and fMRI clearly show involvement of the amygdala in recognizing emotional 
facial expression, and suggest it may be important for social cognition as well 
(Kandel, et al., 1991). People decide to trust (or not) based on whether the 
other person’s anticipated actions represent a potential threat or a potential 
reward (they will cooperate and behave as expected).  The amygdala acts 
somewhat like a “social sonar” for interpersonal cues, helping us anticipate 
how the other person is likely to act.    
 
The prefrontal cortex (PFC) 
 
The prefrontal cortex (PFC) is the brain’s goal-
directing cognitive control center.  The PFC can 
be subdivided into three major regions: orbital, 
medial, and lateral. The orbital and medial 
regions are largely involved in emotional 
behavior, and the lateral region provides the 
cognitive support to regulate speech, reasoning, 
and the sequencing of behavior (Fuster, 2001). A 
robust and consistent finding is that the medial prefrontal 
areas are activated in humans when they are evaluating social 
norms and engaged in mentalizing tasks, particularly assessing another 
person's essential character or enduring traits (as opposed to what the person 
is imminently intending to do) (Frith & Frith 2003; Van Overwalle, 2009).  It 
may also help to maintain a self-other distinction while facilitating our ability to 
relate to an experience or situation from another person's perspective (Elliott, 
et al., 2000). The PFC handles working memory and behavioral rules, which it 
synthesizes with information from all the forebrain systems to choose an 
appropriate course of action (Blumenfeld & Ranganath, 2007). The PFC helps 
us to organize and evaluate the neurochemical signals (and other conscious 
social cues) of fear, threat, or reward and to analyze the situation from the 
other’s perspective to decide whether acting on trust is warranted in a 
particular situation. 
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The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) 
 
The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) located on the 
orbital surface of the frontal lobe, receives 
inputs from various sensory regions and from 
subcortical structures, such as the amygdala 
(Elliott, et al., 2003). The OFC is actively 
engaged in regulating social behavior, 
especially in reasoning and making decisions and 
choosing responses under conditions of 
uncertainty (Elliott, et al., 2003). The OFC is 
simultaneously active with the amygdala, in monitoring and 
storing information about reward conditions and values, 
especially in iterative transactions (Elliott, et al., 2000).  It is activated both with 
intentional and unintentional (embarrassing) social norm violations (Berthoz, et 
al., 2002).  It is also responsive to angry faces (Elliott, et al., 2000) and is likely 
part of a system that responds to others’ anger and aversive reactions. So, the 
OFC – like the PFC –also supports our reasoning/decision-making about trust, 
but its effect is strongest when the situation is ambiguous, and it relies heavily 
on emotion-related signals for the amygdala.   
 
 
The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 
 
The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is part of the 
brain’s executive control system, responsible in 
part for resolving conflicting information such 
as when people are sending “mixed signals.”  
Functional neuroimaging studies have shown 
ACC activity during tasks that engage 
selective and sustained attention, working 
memory, language generation, conflict 
monitoring, and controlled information 
processing (Botvinick et al., 1999; Carter et al., 
1998; Cohen & Servan-Schrieber, 1992; Posner et al, 2006; 
Raichle, 2003). The ACC is also anatomically connected to limbic 
(controlling emotion) and motor (controlling movement) cortical structures. 
Humans’ ability to infer another person’s mental states – sometimes called 
mentalizing - seems to rely on activation of the ACC, as well as medial 
prefrontal areas. It may also be a hub of emotional and cognitive decision 
inputs for choosing how to behave in ambiguous or uncertain circumstances – 
then storing that learning for future reference.  Like other frontal areas of the 
brain, the ACC supports our decisions about interpersonal trust by controlling 
the flow of emotional and informational inputs for the decision, and by 
prompting a particular course of action.   
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Relationship & Behaviors 
 
Trust is affected not only by the trustor’s internal decision processes and 
appraisal of the trustee, but also by the social and contextual elements of the 
relationship and the parties’ behaviors as they interact.  These elements can 
shape the relevance and amplitude of signals and cues that human use to 
others’ trustworthiness, with obvious implications when trying to understand 
and quantify different kinds of trust.  In this section, we review some of the 
latest evidence related to the role of relationships and behaviors in terms of 
how another is determined to be trustworthy and thus who trusts whom.     
 
 
Interpersonal trust, as we noted, is theoretically rooted in 
economic principles of social exchange, but in reality, 
people often do not follow the economically optimal course 
of action.  Researchers suggest one reason for this is that different norms of 
social behavior apply in different relational contexts – what some refer to as 
communal and exchange norms (Clark & Mills, 1993; Mills & Clark, 1994). The 
economic model is based on market or exchange-based norms where goods 
or services are ascribed some specific value and are paid for or reciprocally 
exchanged in direct proportion to their worth.  
 
When you go to the convenience store to get a gallon of milk, the expectation 
is that you will pay the marked price to the cashier, and complete the 
transaction.  If you advertise in the newspaper to trade some item or service 
for another, you will seek and expect to acquire something of comparable 
value to what you are offering.  The other party will too.  Those are 
fundamental shared assumptions in an exchange relationship, because – 
according to a common Euro-American paradigm - “it’s just business.”   This of 
course is an idealized version of this kind of exchange, and rarely – if ever – 
reflects reality.  Even in business, we develop relationships with owners, 
employees, and customers; we come to trust certain people and stores over 
others; and we select different partners with whom to do business for many 
reasons, some of which are not purely exchange-based, but are also related to 
the fact that we trust them as people. However, there is still the expectation 
that interpersonal trust will only get you so far in business.   
 
On the other hand, with family and friends – what Clark and Mills (1993) call 
communal relationships – the parties’ motivations and expectations for 
exchange are very different.  In communal relationships exchanges of goods 
and services are typically motivated by a caring emotional bond with the other 
person and a desire to help them or serve their interests.  There is no general 
concern about comparable exchange; in fact, the social relationship is better 
served if benefits exchanged are not exclusively quid pro quo.   
 
 
 
Contextual 
Norms 
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Contextual Norms in Action 
 
An interesting parallel exists with individuals or groups aiming to cultivate trust. 
Individual motivations for providing information to a competitor or adversary 
often vary in different people or even in the same person over time.  
Individuals who are effective trustors try to track how these motivations evolve.  
At times, a potential trustee may be “all business” about a particular tasking, 
but at other times may be reflecting more on how what (s)he is doing might be 
serving some cause or greater good, and – not uncommonly – some 
transactions heavily leverage the social capital that exists in the relationship 
between the trustor and trustee.   If trustors are out of synch with the trustee’s 
expectations, they risk damaging the relationship and potentially alienating the 
potential or former trustee, when in fact they may be only vulnerable if they are 
unable to accurately detect any change in the trustee’s trustworthiness.   
 
 
 
More than half a century ago, Gordon Allport (1954) 
discussed the central importance of ingroup - outgroup 
status on prejudice and interpersonal perceptions.  A 
substantial body of social psychological research shows 
consistently that people rate fellow ingroup members much more positively 
than outgroup members across a wide range of social attributes, including 
trustworthiness (Brewer, 1996; Turner, 1987). Perhaps this predisposition to 
ingroup affinity is an evolutionary adaptation (Brewer, 1999). Interdependence 
– and therefore cooperation – is a necessary condition for the long-term 
survival of the human species, but indiscriminate trust, as an individual 
strategy, is maladaptive.  In this way, “ingroups can be defined as bounded 
communities of mutual trust and obligation that delimit mutual interdependence 
and cooperation” (Brewer, 1999, p. 433).   
 
Within the ingroup there exists a depersonalized bond of trust that extends to 
all its members; one that is not contingent on other social knowledge or 
affective connections between individual parties.  Group membership itself 
carries the imprimatur of trustworthiness. Some have referred to this as a form 
of “Category-based trust” (Kramer, 1999) and there is some evidence, as we 
have seen, that such a category-based trust can help reduce cognitive load in 
humans by providing mental shortcuts:  you can trust person X because they 
are part of group Y. 
 
Neuroscientific studies show that as people come to identify with an ingroup 
(what some would call identification-based trust [IBT, see page 9 for more 
discussion on IBT]), they increasingly process what happens to fellow 
members as though they were experiencing it themselves, down to the neural 
level (Damasio, Damasio, Immordino-Yang, and McColl, 2009).  There are 
even observable responses, like facial expressions, that may signal that kind 
of emotional identification (Decety & Yamada, 2009). Having a general IBT 
with ingroup members predisposes us to perceive them more positively and to 
accord them preference over outgroup members.  This supports the “social 
intuitionist” model of morality, which argues that moral judgment is as much of 
In Group /  
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a social process as it is an individual “in one’s own head” decision (Greene, et 
al., 2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt & Bjorkland, 2007; Young & Koenigs, 
2007).   
 
Like other cognitive biases discussed earlier, knowing another person’s group 
status becomes a mental/emotional shortcut, at least to determine the initial or 
baseline level of trust.  Initial levels of trust will almost always be higher for 
ingroup members and lower for outgroup members.  Conversely, levels of 
distrust will almost always be initially higher for outgroup members and low for 
ingroup members (Kramer, 1999b; Turner, 1987; Williams, 2001).  Perhaps we 
interpret outgroup status as indicating that the others’ values are different than 
our own, since we know that perceptions of value incongruence can evoke 
distrust (Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Factors that might mitigate ingroup-outgroup 
prejudice have been studied extensively.  Some of the strategies that seem to 
reduce those biases most effectively are:  having extended contact between 
ingroup and outgroup members (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Turner, Hewstone, 
& Voci, 2007); redefining social categories to emphasize a common goal or 
identity between ingroup and outgroup members (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000); 
and emphasizing similarities between the groups (Gabarrot, et al., 2009).  
 
 
 
In a relational context – as opposed to a single transaction 
– interpersonal trust is profoundly affected by the 
behaviors and interactions between the parties over time.  
This means trust is a dynamic variable.  Even in a behavioral economic 
paradigm, when our trust is honored with cooperation, we count that as a 
reward or positive reinforcement, increasing the likelihood and possibly 
breadth of trust in future transactions.  In essence, we learn about others’ 
trustworthiness by their actions.  When our trust is violated, however, by the 
other party’s defection or betrayal, it is a negative response (punishment) that 
not only makes future trust less likely, but also may positively reinforce distrust 
in that person (Jones and George, 1998).   
 
Social closeness is another determinant of trustworthy behavior.  Cooperation 
tends to increase in closer relationships (Glaeser, et al., 2000; Orbell, van de 
Kragt, & Dawes, 1988; Macy & Skvoretz, 1998; Buchan, Croson, & Dawes, 
2002), leading some to the conclusion that social distance is the first 
determinant of trust (Macy & Skvoretz, 1998).  Perhaps this effect is based, in 
part, on having more experience with the other person in a greater number of 
transactions across different contexts, which might increase our confidence in 
predictions or expectations about the other person’s future action (Sitkin and 
Roth, 1993).  This experiential calculus is probably a reasonable basis for trust 
decisions, since past trusting behaviors – much more than trust attitudes - are 
known to predict people’s future trust behavior (Glaeser, et al., 2000). 
 
Peripheral indices of social distance and self-other similarity, however, also 
appear to affect trust decisions.  Persons perceived as having high status 
(e.g., family status, social skill, charisma) tend to garner greater trust (more 
cooperation, fewer defections) from others, while persons who are 
Relational 
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demographically different – for example, of a different race or nationality – tend 
to exhibit less trustworthy behavior (more defections) with one another 
(Glaeser, et al., 2000). 
 
Trust’s effect is reciprocal. Our trust in other people tends to increase as we 
come to believe that they increasingly trust us.  The converse also appears to 
be true with distrust (Butler, 1983), creating something of a positive-feedback 
cycle for trust and distrust.  Researchers have replicated this dynamic both in 
organizational and interpersonal contexts.  When managers increase 
employee monitoring, it tends to make workers distrustful toward management 
(Cialdini, 1996; Kruglanski 1970).  Interestingly, although not conclusive, some 
evidence suggests that in interpersonal encounters persons who tend to be 
more trusting of others, tend to be more trustworthy themselves (Glaeser, et 
al., 2000) – though the converse might not always be true.   However, this 
notion can be taken to extremes in some cases, such as in people with 
Williams Syndrome, a rare, pathological condition that, according to several 
reports, makes people “biologically incapable of not trusting people,” to include 
total strangers.  These people are themselves consequently untrustworthy 
since they are unable to take appropriate caution in situations in which most 
neurotypical humans would be at least slower to trust others.  
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Individual and Cross-
Cultural Differences 
A variety of  individual and cultural differences can influence the 
type of  trust generated within different contexts, the starting point 
or baseline level of  trust, and the specific behavioral expression of  
trust. In some cases, there are clear biological underpinnings to these 
differences, and in others, the physiological mechanism(s) remains 
unknown.  Further, many cultures will have very different 
assumptions about whom to trust, and to what extent.  
 
 
1. Baseline trust or “trust propensity” (also known as “generalized trust” 
e.g., whether someone tends to assume that most people are 
trustworthy or that most people cannot be trusted) varies substantially 
from person to person, and is affected by a variety of influences, 
including past experience, genetic predisposition, and personality 
characteristics. 
2. In extreme cases, like criminals or individuals with antisocial personality 
disorders, there are well-documented differences in both the structure 
and function of specific brain regions that are likely involved in forming 
trust. 
3. Even very small genetic differences can have substantial impacts on 
physiology and behavior, which – while far from conclusive – may 
explain some variance in people’s trust and trustworthiness. While a 
single “trust gene” has not been identified, the study of disorders that 
impair social interactions has identified several genes that appear to be 
linked to certain trust-related processes. 
4. In much the same way that cultural norms affect interpersonal 
Section 
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communication, they can also affect perceptions of normative or 
expected trust behaviors. While a majority of trust research to date has 
been conducted with European and American participants, these 
studies are increasingly being extended to non-Western cultures. 
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, while the neurobiology of trust itself may be 
universal to most humans, the assumptions of who and what to trust 
vary among different groups and cultures.  Indeed, many findings point 
to cultural differences in the propensity to trust others and to 
reciprocate when an individual behaves in a manner indicating trust. 
 
rust’s intense complexity is compounded by the different ways in which 
it operates for different people or groups of people.  Just as people vary 
in their general personality traits – for reasons that have biological, 
psychological, and social underpinnings – they also vary in their 
baseline trust or general assumptions about others’ trustworthiness.  Likewise, 
an individual’s personality and psychological behavior may affect different 
people in different ways. Finally, culture and patterns of socialization can affect 
both our predispositions to trust as well as how we process social/emotional 
information related to trust.   
 
If the communities seeking to understand trust and scientists studying trust are 
to move toward an integrated biopsychosocial understanding of how 
interpersonal trust works for whom and under what circumstances, discerning 
systematic differences occurring across individuals and across groups will be 
critical.    
 
Interindividual Differences 
 
Individuals vary considerably in their propensity to trust based on whether they 
view “most people” as being reliable (or not) and in their willingness to depend 
on them (or not) (McKnight & Cervaney 2001, 2002).  Some begin each 
interpersonal encounter with the assumption that others are usually 
competent, benevolent, honest/ethical, and predictable; that is, that they are 
trustworthy.  Others – often generalizing from past experiences of betrayal - 
adopt the opposite assumptions.   
 
This is the domain of individual differences known as trust propensity (Kramer, 
1999; McKnight et al., 1998; Mayer et al., 1995; Rotter, 1967).  In the literature 
on organizational behavior, this is sometimes called “dispositional trust,” and in 
other social science literature is referred to as “generalized social trust,” “thin 
trust,” or “impersonal trust” (Delhey & Newton, 2003; 2005). It is not a trust 
conditioned on any specific cognitive or affective appraisal of another person’s 
individual characteristics, which is sometimes called “particularized trust,” or 
“strategic trust.”   Trust propensity is the individual’s default or starting point for 
T 
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trust in nearly all interpersonal encounters. It is most often measured in large-
scale social surveys by using a single “Generalized Trust Question” (GTQ)  – a 
forced-choice item in which respondents either endorse the statement that: “in 
general, most people can be trusted” (these are called the trusters) or the 
statement “you can't be too careful in dealing with people.”  Reasonable 
concerns have been raised, however, about whether the traditional GTQ 
measure might confound the concepts of trust and caution (Miller & Mitamura, 
2003). 
 
Trust propensity is probably not so much a distinct personality trait as it is a 
behavioral tendency driven by a collection of traits – some temperamental, 
others shaped by experiences – that predispose people to be more or less 
willing to be vulnerable to others (as discussed below, for example, some 
research suggests that generalized trust is positively associated with I.Q, see 
Sturgis, 2009; Haier, 2009). People can be trusting or distrustful in different 
ways.  Some evidence suggests, however, at a neural level, trust propensity 
(unconditional trust) may operate though a different set of processes than 
conditional or situation-specific trust.  In one neuroimaging study, for example, 
individuals who made choices consistent with unconditional trust showed 
selective activation of a brain region associated with social attachment (i.e., 
septal area), whereas subjects who demonstrated conditional trust were seen 
to have differential activity of an area known to identify and evaluate rewards 
(i.e., ventral tegmental area) (Krueger, et al., 2007). 
 
Personality factors and traits may comprise the primary internally-driven 
domain of individual differences.  Interindividual differences in personality traits 
are reflected both in phenotypic variance, their characteristic patterns of 
cognition, affect and behavior, and in biotypical variance, underlying 
physiological or biological differences.  Each type of interindividual variance 
affects the other (Stemmler & Wacker, 2009).  A biopsychosocial approach to 
personality might define it as “a dynamic organization, inside the person, of 
psychophysical systems that create the person’s characteristic patterns of 
behavior, thoughts, and feelings” (Carver & Scheier, 2004, p. 5). 
 
“on a very general level, sources of individual differences in manifest 
variables are biological (Canli, 2006). These sources comprise the 
genotype and the individual structure and function of the body’s organs, in 
particular the brain. Recent research has reported intriguing findings, for 
example, personality correlates of genetic polymorphisms (e.g., Ebstein, 
2006) or of brain structure (e.g., Wright et al., 2006) and function (e.g., 
O'Gorman et al., 2006). Thus, a portion of the interindividual variance in 
manifest variables (phenotypical variance) is attributable to biotypical 
variance” (Stemmler & Wacker, 2009, pp.3-4). 
 
Research has linked trust propensity to other well-established personality 
traits. Within the well-established Five Factor Model of personality (which 
includes Extraversion, Neuroticism, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness, 
and Conscientiousness), the trait of agreeableness has shown a particularly 
strong and positive association with predisposition to trust others (Mooradian 
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et al., 2006).  This finding harmonizes with earlier studies showing 
interindividual variance in predispositions toward competitive versus 
cooperative behavior.  Those who are more competitively oriented were more 
likely to view others as being untrustworthy and to behave toward them 
accordingly (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970).   
 
Researchers tend to find higher levels of trust propensity (generalized social 
trust) among persons with better jobs and with higher levels of education and 
income.  A recent study followed two British birth cohorts (comprising more 
than 35,000 people) over several decades and found that intelligence 
(measured around age 10) predicted generalized trust in later adulthood, 
lending support to Yamagishi’s (2001) hypothesis about a link between trust 
and IQ.  The essence of this theory, which Yamagishi developed from 
observing behavioral game performance, is that “socially astute individuals are 
better able to accurately detect signs of (un)trustworthiness in social and 
economic interactions. This means that, throughout life, they do not suffer the 
costs of betrayal so frequently, as they are less inclined to place their trust in 
those who are unlikely to honour it” (Sturgis, et al., 2009, p.8).  It is possible 
that appropriately gauged interpersonal trust is part of the complex of what 
makes smart people successful (Haier, 2009). 
 
Interpersonal suspiciousness, on the other hand, has been associated with 
predispositions to distrust since some of Morton Deustch’s (1958) earliest 
writings on trust-related phenomena, emphasizing its effects on the cognitive 
dimensions of trust.  Persons who are high in suspiciousness tend to be more 
self-conscious than others, and tend both to overestimate and to selectively 
attend to negative aspects of interpersonal interactions (Kaney, et al., 1997; 
Lee & Won, 1998; Marchand & Vonk, 2005) –factors likely to enhance the 
intensity of their distrust, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy of sorts and 
highlighting the costs of inappropriate distrust in certain situations.  Research 
also has shown that persons with low trust propensity have higher rates of 
divorce, unemployment, discrimination, and poorer general health (Sturgis, et 
al., 2009).   
 
Interindividual variance in trust-related processes and characteristics applies 
not only to self-report or phenotypic measures but also extends to 
physiological and neuroimaging measures as well. “Individual differences 
prevail in physiological recordings just as they do in behavior, thoughts, and 
feelings, even if individuals are in the same situation” (Stemmler & Wacker, 
2009, p. 3). The measured variation may be caused by interindividual 
differences in brain structure, neural function, and perhaps even genetic 
predisposition, and recent research in epigenetics (that is, the study of the 
ways that experience can literally cause genes to be expressed or silenced) 
suggests that this mechanism may be more at work than previously 
appreciated.    
 
 
An earlier section on determinants of trust in the trustor 
described different brain areas and mechanisms involved 
in an individual’s trust-related appraisals, responses and 
Structural 
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decisions.  A number of studies have found – with some consistency - that the 
brains of people who exhibit persistent antisocial and interpersonally 
transgressive behavior and who show little empathy or emotional regard for 
others are structurally different than brains of normal controls (Raine, 2008).  
Those structural differences tend to be most pronounced in areas of the brain 
associated with processing of social/emotional information and regulatory 
functions, which also happen to be the areas integral to trust-related 
processes. 
 
Among criminal offenders, the prefrontal cortices – centers for regulating 
behavior and controlling emotion - tend to be smaller and to have less grey 
matter (fewer neurons).  Their amygdalae (fear centers) tend to be smaller, 
and the hippocampus (which regulates conditioning and learning) is much 
more likely to be asymmetrical – at least among the “unsuccessful” ones who 
get caught- with the right side being larger than the left. The corpus callosum - 
a nerve fiber bundle that connects the brain’s left and right hemispheres – 
tends to be larger but thinner than normal; a structural abnormality that may 
accelerate transmission between the hemispheres, but which is also 
associated with diminished interpersonal emotional responsiveness, resulting 
in diminished feelings of social attachment or of remorse (Patrick, 2007; Raine, 
2008; Raine & Yang, 2006).   
 
 
Interpersonal trust decisions appear to be heavily 
influenced by our automatic emotional reactions, and by 
our ability to assess the other person and anticipate her or 
his course of action.  These processes all show significant interindividual 
variance. 
 
Persons possessing psychopathic traits (e.g., persistently violating the rights of 
others and being callous and unemotional) are generally thought not to behave 
in trustworthy ways.  This may be related – at least in part – to abnormalities in 
their functional social cognitive circuitry.  Because trust typically emerges from 
a reciprocal exchange, these abnormalities can affect both how they perceive 
others and how others perceive them.  
 
Psychopaths are among the people with serious deficiencies in their ability to 
(1) identify social cues, (2) to produce an appropriate reaction or response, 
and (3) to regulate emotional reactions and behavioral responses (Phillips, 
2003a; 2003b). Studies have shown they have significant difficulty discerning 
emotion from others’ facial expressions and language; are particularly impaired 
in identifying sadness and fear in others; and tend to have severe deficits in 
their inhibitory controls and executive functioning (Gao & Raine, 2009).  The 
brain’s executive functions not only produce and shape high-level reasoning 
and help put the brakes on impulsive actions, but they also play a vital role in 
self- and other-monitoring that affects social sensitivity, social awareness, and 
empathy (Herba, et al., 2007).  
 
 
Functional 
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For the past half-century behavioral geneticists have strived 
to identify and understand how genetic variations might 
account for individual differences in traits and behavior.  Nearly all DNA is 
composed from four nucleotides, which are represented as strands or 
sequences by the letters A (adenine), C (cytosine), T (thymine), and G 
(guanine). More than 99% of DNA sequences found in humans are identical 
and have remained quite stable 
across many generations of 
evolutionary adaptation. That 
small margin of interindividual 
variance, however, can produce 
substantial effects.  
 
Genetic Variation and SNPs 
 
Because genes, like most 
cellular units, almost never 
function in isolation, but rather 
in the context of other genetic, 
functional and structural 
influences, discerning the 
effects of specific genes or 
particular behaviors gets 
complicated very quickly.  More 
typically, genetic effects on 
behavior seem not to be direct 
and singularly causal, but to 
occur by creating a “genetic 
predisposition.”  An intriguing 
development in the study of 
interindividual genetic variation 
is the single-nucleotide 
polymorphism (SNP, 
pronounced as “snip”).  A SNP 
occurs when a particular DNA 
sequence differs by one 
nucleotide (hence “single 
nucleotide”) between individuals 
or between paired 
chromosomes within a given 
individual.   
 
As in the graphic above, the 
sequence AACTAAC compared 
to AATTAAC would be an 
example of a SNP in which the 
first cytosine (C) nucleotide in 
the sequence was replaced by a 
thymine (T) nucleotide.  These 
Genetic 
Differences 
SINGLE NUCLEOTIDE 
POLYMORPHISMS 
 
Single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) refers to a 
genetic variation where a particular DNA 
sequence differs by just one nucleotide (hence 
“single nucleotide”) between individuals or 
between a pair of chromosomes within a given 
individual.  From a molecular standpoint, this is a 
very minor difference, but the resulting effects 
may be substantial.  That tiny variation might 
change the way a particular chemical receptor is 
formed in the brain or even render the brain 
unable to produce a particular chemical at all.  It 
can also have substantive and multiple effects on 
other genes’ activity, which can also shape brain 
functions. Changes in the way brain chemicals are 
produced or function can profoundly affect our 
emotions, our ability to think, and a variety of 
other behaviors. 
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small changes account for a large proportion of what makes humans 
genetically different from one another (Syvanen, 2001).  No specific allele or 
DNA “trust sequence” has been found, though one particular SNP in OT 
receptors has been implicated as a cause of social attachment/affiliative 
deficits found in people with autism spectrum disorders (Jacob, et al., 2007).  
The previously mentioned Williams syndrome is caused by the deletion of 
genetic material from the region q11.23 of chromosome 7 (importantly, this 
region has at least 25 genes, which also explains the cognitive impairment 
associated with the pathological trusting behaviors in Williams Syndrome 
patients).  
 
Culture and Interpersonal Trust 
 
Cultural factors comprise one of the primary externally-driven domains of 
individual differences. Unlike many psychosocial constructs that have been 
researched almost exclusively with European-American college students, 
interpersonal trust has sparked quite a bit of intercultural and cross-cultural 
inquiry.  Edward T. Hall (1959), a pioneer in the study of intercultural 
communication, speculated in the 1950s that persons from more collectivist 
and “high context” cultures (such as Asia and the Middle East) might construe 
and value interpersonal trust differently than persons from more individualistic 
and “low context” cultures (such as the U.S. and Western Europe).   
 
In low context communication, people transmit ideas 
and sentiments primarily through words and specific, 
detailed verbal descriptions. Meaning derived from high 
context communication, however, relies much more 
heavily on shared experiences and expectations between the parties.  In 
essence, high context communication assumes that one is transmitting ideas 
to other members of one’s own ingroup. “Inside jokes” are an example of high 
context communication.  Hall suggested that in high context cultures the 
collective bond or promise was a dominant determinant of trust, whereas in 
low context cultures more reliance is placed on structural safeguards such as 
contracts, rules, laws and enforcement of consequences (Hall, 1959).  
 
Having compared World Values Survey results from 60 
nations, Delhey and Newton (2005) conclude that 
“generalized trust is very unevenly distributed across the 
globe” (p. 311), with estimates that “most people can be 
trusted” ranging from 60% of the population in Norway and Sweden, to less 
than 10% in Turkey and Brazil. They find that the “high trust” countries tend to 
be those with greater ethnic heterogeneity, more pervasive Protestant religious 
traditions, good governance, higher gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
and greater population equality among household incomes (Delhery & Newton, 
2005).  So, at a national level, trust seems to correlate with measures of 
success. Hall’s cross cultural comparisons focused mainly on the contrast 
between Japan and the United States.  Subsequent cross cultural studies of 
Low and High 
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trust have extended Hall’s work on Japan and the U.S. (Hayashi et al., 1999; 
Yamagishi et al., 1998) but also expanded inquiry to include a wide array of 
nations around the globe.   
 
A very preliminary question has been whether “levels of trust” (presumably 
referring to trust propensity and generalized trust) differ among countries.  
Research studies have found that countries like Sweden, China, and the U.S. 
are high on trust propensity, while countries like Russia, India, and Mexico, are 
moderate, and citizens of countries like Romania or Brazil tend to have lower 
trust propensity (Johnson & Cullen, 2002). Results have sometimes been 
counter-intuitive:  one study found, for example, that people in Bulgaria 
(Koford, 2001) have higher trust levels than those in the U.S.   A four-nation 
study compared trust behaviors in a single round economic investment 
dilemma game among nearly 600 participants from China, Japan, Korea, and 
the United States, finding that – independent of ethnicity – U.S. and Chinese 
nationals showed greater trust (more money “invested” in the partner player), 
than those from Japan and Korea.  The authors suggest that norms of 
reciprocity and of trust may vary across countries (Buchan, Croson, & Dawes, 
2002).  Further interesting research has been done in trying to explain trust 
behavior as explained by market integration and size of the group, and has 
generally found that trust and trustworthiness varies across 15 different 
societies based on several social and cultural factors (Henrich, 2004).  
 
 
Studies that have examined different trust and 
reciprocation patterns within a given country have also 
found significant differences, some of which appear to be 
mediated by stereotypes (see Fershtman and Gneezy, 
2001 for one such example comprising different ethnic groups in Israel and 
Barr 2001, for a study comparing traditional and resettled villages in 
Zimbabwe).  Others however are much more complex to interpret.   In the 
Buchan, et al. (2002) four nation study, results demonstrated varied trends in 
trust (how much of the initial endowment was given to the partner) and 
reciprocation – what some would call trustworthiness (the amount of the 
investment returned to the investor).   
 
The Chinese participants showed high trust and high reciprocation, while the 
Japanese participants had the reverse pattern, giving little of their endowment 
and receiving little in return (see also Buchan, Johnson, & Croson, 2006).  The 
U.S. group tended to show high trust but low reciprocity and the Korean group 
showed low trust, but high reciprocity. This is consistent with findings by 
Danielson and Holm (2002) that reciprocity norms seemed to apply similarly in 
the U.S. and Sweden, but not in Tanzania, where reciprocity patterns were 
substantially different.   The Buchan et al (2002) study asked subjects to only 
play a single round of the game, so we don’t know whether these patterns 
might converge across multiple rounds.  It certainly raises some intriguing 
questions, however, about intergoup variance across cultures – such as what 
causes these differences?; is it possible to shape a country’s trust?; and how 
might this kind of knowledge affect intercultural negotiation?.  
Does Trust 
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What is the mechanism or mechanisms by which culture 
might affect interpersonal trust?  One of the distinguishing 
factors discussed most often in the literature concerns the 
extent to which members of a culture value and define 
themselves by individualistic and independent features or by collectivist and 
interdependent features of their identities (Hofstede, 1980; Markus and 
Kitayama, 1991; Matsumoto et al., 1998; Mesquita and Karasawa, 2002; 
Triandis, 1995).  We know from related social psychological research that 
when people are dependent on others, they tend to perceive the others as 
more trustworthy (Weber et al., 2007).    
 
Cultural affinity toward collectivist vs individualist orientations can also affect 
trust’s ingroup - outgroup dynamic, though not necessarily in expected ways.  
In a number of studies, people not surprisingly tend to extend more trusting 
behaviors to ingroup members than to outgroup members. When researchers 
studied the phenomenon across countries, however, and randomly assigned 
players either to a partner from the player’s own country or to a partner from a 
different country, the more individualistic players showed a greater ingroup 
trust preference than the collectivist players, who extended to their citizen 
neighbors only the same degree of trust as they extend to the strangers 
(Buchan, Croson, & Dawes, 2002). 
 
Independent vs interdependent orientations can affect a number of cognitive 
and emotional processes related to trust.  In each of these contexts, different 
norms and values apply to emotional expression.  Persons in interdependent 
contexts tend to value emotional moderation and control and especially avoid 
expressing negative and socially disengaging emotions (Kim and Markus, 
2002; Kitayama et al., 2006; Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Tsai et al., 2006; Wu 
and Tseng, 1985).  In independent and individualistic contexts, however, 
emotional expression is regarded as “psychologically healthy” and a signal of 
individual authenticity (Bellah et al., 1985; Kim and Sherman, 2007; 
Matsumoto, 1990; Suh et al., 1998).   
 
These emotional control patterns even correspond to different 
neurophysiological responses (Goldin, et al., 2008).  In a study comparing 
Asian American (AA) and European American (EA) females’ reactions to an 
anger evoking stimulus, AAs who valued emotional control felt less anger, 
exhibited less angry behavior and showed a cardiovascular response 
consistent with an active, motivated self-control response, and confidence in 
their regulatory capacity.    For EA women, valuing emotional control 
diminished angry behavior but did not reduce their experience of anger.  Their 
cardiovascular responses were more consistent with confronting a real threat, 
perhaps because they did not have the same confidence (and/or experience) 
in controlling their emotional reactions (Mauss & Butler, 2009).  
 
Persons acculturated to independent and interdependent orientations have 
been found to perceive the world, particularly the social world, in fundamentally 
different ways.  This line of research suggests that the effects of culture on 
How Might 
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social interactions are not just mediated by different social norms and beliefs, 
but by moderating perceptions and encoding of social information.  
 
Social psychologist Dr. Richard Nisbett at the University of Michigan has 
advanced the exploration of these differences with rigor and depth, particularly 
as they relate to patterns in behavioral differences between Westerners (e.g., 
Americans) and East Asians (e.g., Japanese and Chinese) (Nisbett, 2003; 
Nisbett & Masuda, 2003).  Nisbett and his team find, in general, that 
Westerners make sense of their experiences and novel situations by:  
 
(1) identifying and focusing primarily on a central object of interest;  
(2) evaluating the object and its features to determine the category of 
stimuli to which it belong; and  
(3) using formal logic and analysis to understand the stimulus and its 
actions.   
East Asians, by contrast, tend to:  
 
(1) focus primarily on the context – not a specific object – in a novel 
situation;  
(2) not to categorize the stimulus or its components, but to holistically view 
the context as the “causal factor” in the event; and  
(3) rely on dialectical reasoning (recursive analysis from multiple points of 
view) and associative thinking rather than formal logic to discern 
meaning from what they perceive.  
They also suggest these perceptual differences originate and emerge from 
operating in different social systems (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, A., 
2001).  
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Conclusion 
 
To be trusted is a greater compliment than to be loved. 
- George Macdonald 
Trust everybody, but cut the cards. 
- Finley Peter Dunne 
 
nterpersonal trust is complicated, but integral to individuals and 
organizations that operate in complex and dynamic environments where 
human interactions are key to achieving goals.  Understanding how, why 
and when people decide to be (or not to be) vulnerable to others and how 
they assess and decide how others are likely to behave toward them gets at 
the heart of why many individuals and organizations striving to build trust 
succeed or fail.  It may even go some way in explaining why some 
organizations and some diverse communities of professionals have an ability 
to work collaboratively toward a common set of objectives, even in real world 
competitive environments in which very little can be said to be “trustworthy.”    
 
This research-based overview on interpersonal trust has explored the myriad 
ways in which trust has been defined, how it operates, and the factors that 
may cause it to work differently for some people than for others. It seems there 
is a solid conceptual platform from which to launch a program of research on 
interpersonal trust that might serve the long-term interests of academia, 
industry, and government.   
 
A number of challenges and a great deal of exciting work lie ahead.  To 
succeed, researchers as well as people whose work depends, in part, on trust 
and assessing trustworthiness may need to re-examine some long-held 
assumptions about trust’s relationship to deception, stress, and its role in 
dealing with competitors as well as with allies.    
 
In re-examining these assumptions, a trust-based research agenda may offer 
individuals and organizations new payoffs and new opportunities.  At the same 
Section 
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time, it is clear that such an agenda must accept the inherent complexity of 
human problems, knowing that human behavior does not necessarily operate 
under orderly, universal laws like those that govern problems in fields such as 
physics and engineering.  The cautious researcher will proceed with the view 
that humans are biopsychosocial organisms – neither determined exclusively 
by nature nor nurture, but profoundly affected by both.  Consequently, it is 
unlikely that any researcher will find just “one thing” – biologically, 
psychologically, socially, or technologically - that will explain everything about 
interpersonal trust.  People are composed of and operate within living systems 
– the biological, psychological and social factors affect each other not just in 
linear ways, but also recursively.  And while humans are all carbon-based 
entities that have similar DNA structures, there are also profound differences 
between individuals that are likely to foil any attempts to find a “one-size-fits-
all” approach to trust and trustworthiness.   
 
With those caveats in mind, however, the literature suggests that many 
research communities know considerably more about interpersonal trust today 
than they did even a decade ago.  With rigorous, persistent, and applied 
scientific research, it is not unreasonable to expect that what is known about 
trust in complex and dynamic environments will grow even more.    
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Appendix A 
SOME CLASSIFICATIONS OF TRUST: A SYNTHESIS 
From Sandro Castaldo (2003) 
 
Criteria Typologies 
 
Trust dimensions 
 
- Ideological, cognitive, emotional & routine trust (Lewis & Wiegert, 1985)  
- Affective, cognitive & behavioral trust (Cummings & Bromiley, 1996)  
- Behavioral & intentional trust (Nooteboom, Berger & Noorderhaven, 1997)  
- Affect-based & cognition-based trust (McAllister, 1995)  
- Reliableness & emotional trust (Johnson-George & Swap, 1982)  
- Values, attitude and mood & emotions (Jones & George, 1998)  
- Institutionalization & habitualization (Nooteboom, Berger & Noorderhaven, 1997)  
- Competence- & goodwill-based dimensions (Nooteboom, 1996) 
Relational layer  
- Calculative, institutional (‘hyphenated’) & personal trust (Williamson, 1993)  
- Insititutional-based, system-based & societal trust (Lane, 1998)  
- Individual, inter-personal, institutional trust (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995)  
- Calculative, relational & institutional trust (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & Cannon, 
1998)  
- Dispositional, personal/interpersonal & system trust (McKnight & Chervany)  
Contents and antecedents  
- Calculative, knowledge-based & institutional (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996)  
- Deterrence-based, knowledge-based & identification-based trust (Shapiro, 
Sheppard & Cheraskin, 1992; Sheppard & Tuckinski, 1996)  
- Calculative, cognitive & normative trust (Lane,1998; Child, 1998)  
- Contractual trust, competence trust & goodwill trust (Sako, 1991; Sako & Helper, 
1998)  
- Predictability-based & value-based trust (Sitkin & Roth, 1993)  
- Predictability & explorative trust (Huemer, 2000) 
Strength/Quality  
- Full, instable & hopeful trust (Andaleeb, 1992)  
- Thick or thin, weak or strong, fragile or resilient trust (Williams, 1989, Meyerson, 
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Weick & Kramer, 1996)  
- Weak, semi-strong & strong trust (Barney & Hansen, 1994)  
- Tust vs. distrust (many authors, e.g. Andaleeb, 1992) 
 
Development processes 
 
- Characteristic-based, process-based, institutionally-based (Zucker, 1986)  
- Calculative processes, predictive processes, intention-based processes, 
knowledge-based processes, transfer-based processes (Doney & Cannon, 1997; 
Doney, Cannon & Mullen, 1998) 
 
Other classifications 
 
- Basic trust, guarded trust & extended trust (Brenkert, 1998)  
- Deterrence, obligation, discovery & internalization (Sheppard & Sherman, 1998)  
- Task-focused, fiduciary & relational forms of trust (Barber, 1983) 
 
Contiguous concepts 
 
- Spontaneous trust, generated trust, manipulation & capitulation (Hardy, Phillips & 
Lawrence, 1998)  
- Trust, faith, confidence & reputation (Luhmann, 1989; Hart, 1989)  
- Trust, power & commitment (Gambetta, 1989; Anderson & Weitz, 1993; Morgan 
& Hunt, 1994)  
- Rational prediction, probable anticipation, uncertainty, panic, fate, faith (Lewis & 
Wiegert, 1985) 
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Appendix B 
 
Trust Concepts 
McKnight and Chervany (2001-2002) 
 
Higher Order Concept Facets 
 
Disposition to trust, based on 
a person’s longstanding 
temperamental or personality 
factors (p. 47) 
 
- Faith in humanity (underlying assumptions about people) means that one 
assumes others are usually competent, benevolent, honest/ethical, and predictable  
- Trusting stance (personal strategy) means that, regardless of what one assumes 
about other people generally, one assumes that one will achieve better outcomes 
by dealing with people as though they were well-meaning and reliable 
 
Institution-based trust, 
comprising the situational, 
contextual and environmental 
factors – rather than individual 
ones- that determine trust (p. 
48). 
 
- Structural assurance means that one believes that protective structures—
guarantees, contracts, regulations, promises, legal recourse, processes, or 
procedures—are in place that are conducive to situational success (p. 48). 
- Situational normality means that one believes that the situation in a venture is 
normal or favorable or conducive to situational success (p. 48). 
 
Trusting beliefs, which include 
the trustor’s appraisals about the 
trustee’s competence, 
benevolence, integrity, and 
predictability (p. 49) 
 
- Trusting belief-competence means that one believes that the other party has the 
ability or power to do for one what one needs done. 
- Trusting belief-benevolence means that one believes that the other party cares 
about one and is motivated to act in one’s interest. 
- Trusting belief-integrity means that one believes that the other party makes 
good-faith agreements, tells the truth, acts ethically, and fulfills promises 
- Trusting belief-predictability means that one believes the other party’s actions 
(good or bad) are consistent enough that one can forecast them in a given 
situation. 
 
Trusting intentions, which 
reflect the trustor’s willingness to 
be vulnerable and to depend on 
the behavior of the trustee (p. 
50) 
- Willingness to depend means that one is volitionally prepared to make oneself 
vulnerable to the other party in a situation by relying on the other party 
- Subjective probability of depending means the extent to which one forecasts or 
predicts that one will depend on the other party. 
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Appendix C 
Benefits of Trust for Organizations 
Adapted primarily from Dirks & Ferrin (2001) and Romano (2002) 
 
Trust facilitates: Empirical support offered in:  
 
Productive working relationships and 
competitive business advantage 
 
Braddach, J. L., & Eccles, R. G. (1989). Price, authority, and trust: 
From ideal types to plural forms. Annual Review of Sociology, 
15, 97-118. 
Creed, W. E. D., & Miles, R. E., (1996). Trust in organizations: A 
conceptual framework linking organizational forms, managerial 
philosophies, and the opportunity costs of controls. In R. M. 
Kramer & T. R. Tyler (Eds.), Trust in organizations: Frontiers of 
theory and research (pp. 16-38). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Ring, P. S., & Van de Ven, A. (1994). Developmental processes of 
cooperative interorganizational relationships. Academy of 
Management Review, 19, 90-118. 
Wicks, A. C., Berman, S. L., & Jones, T. M. (1999). The structure of 
optimal trust: Moral and strategic implications. Academy of 
Management Review, 24 (1), 99-116. 
 
Strategic collaboration and 
cooperation  
 
 
 
McAllister, D. J. (1995). Affect- and cognition-based trust as 
foundations for interpersonal cooperation in organizations. 
Academy of Management Journal, 38, 24-59.  
Tsai, W., S. Ghoshal. 1998. Social capital and value creation: The 
role of intra-firm networks. Academy of Management Journal, 41, 
464-476. (via increased resource exchange between 
organizations) 
 
Organizational citizenship behavior 
(via trust in superiors/leaders, co-
workers, and organization) 
 
Deluga, R. J. (1995). The relation between trust in the supervisor 
and subordinate organizational citizenship behavior. Military 
Psychology, 7 (1), 1-16. 
Konovsky, M. A., & Pugh, S. D. (1994). Citizenship behavior and 
social exchange. Academy of Management Journal, 37 (3), 656-
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669. (via trust in leader) 
McAllister, D. 1995. Affect- and cognition-based trust as foundations 
for interpersonal cooperation in organizations. Academy of 
Management Journal, 38, 24-59. (via trust in co-workers) 
Pillai, R., C. Schriesheim, E. Williams, 1999. Fairness perceptions 
and trust as mediators for transformational and transactional 
leadership: A two-study sample. Journal of Management, 25, 
897-933. (via trust in leader) 
Podsakoff, P., S. MacKenzie, R. Moorman, R. Fetter. 1990. 
Transformational leader behaviors and their effects on followers’ 
trust in leader, satisfaction, and organizational citizenship 
behaviors. Leadership Quarterly, 1, 107-142. (via trust in leader) 
Robinson, S. 1996. Trust and the breach of the psychological 
contract. Administrative Science Quarterly, 41, 574-599. (via 
trust in organization) 
 
Conflict resolution  
 
De Dreu, C., E. Giebels, E. Van de Vliert. 1998. Social motives and 
trust in integrative negotiation: The disruptive effects of punitive 
capability. Journal of Applied Psychology, 83, 408-423. (via trust 
between negotiators)  
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